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ABSTRACT—In recent years, the problem of menstrual inequity has attracted
increased attention. Most states impose a sales tax on menstrual hygiene
products—a “tampon tax.” A burgeoning social movement has sought to end
the tampon tax, and lawmakers have taken notice by introducing, and in
some cases successfully passing, measures to repeal the tax by exempting
menstrual hygiene products from the sales tax. This Note evaluates, from a
tax policy standpoint, the pros and cons of repealing the tampon tax. It argues
that although repeal is usually undesirable as a matter of tax design, the tax
should nevertheless be repealed both because menstrual hygiene products
are necessities and because the tax is discriminatory. Building on this
conclusion, this Note further argues for a women’s menstrual health credit,
provided to all women of menstruating age, on the basis that a tax credit
would better bridge the financial disparity gap between women who must
pay for menstrual hygiene products and men who do not. Along the way, this
Note also compares the proposed credit to other proposals to combat
menstrual inequity, such as a free-tampons program and expanding welfare
benefits to include tampons, concluding that the tax credit would create
fewer administrative complexities, would reach more women overall, and is
less stigmatizing.
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Fluid—like that other, inside/outside of philosophical
discourse—is, by nature, unstable. Unless it is subordinated to
geometrism, or (?) idealized.
Woman never speaks the same way. What she emits is flowing,
fluctuating. Blurring. And she is not listened to, unless proper meaning
(meaning of the proper) is lost . . . .
“And there you have it, Gentlemen, that is why your daughters are
dumb.”
—Luce Irigaray †

INTRODUCTION
In 2016, a wave of feminist activism focusing on the burdens of
menstruation swept the world. The aim of the movement was simple: repeal
the tampon tax, a sales tax imposed on tampons and other menstrual hygiene
products. Time Magazine proclaimed 2016 the “Year of the Period,” 1 and a
New York Times editorial headline blared, “End the Tampon Tax.” 2 In

†

THIS SEX WHICH IS NOT ONE 112 (Catherine Porter trans., 5th prtg. 1993).
Maya Rhodan, Tampon Tax Ends in States After ‘Year of the Period,’ TIME (June 3, 2016),
http://time.com/4355164/tampon-tax-ends-in-states-after-year-of-the-period [https://perma.cc/A7ZRPH3J] (noting the increased visibility of menstruation in mainstream media and new legislation to
eliminate taxes on menstrual hygiene products).
2 The Editorial Board, End the Tampon Tax, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/02/08/opinion/end-the-tampon-tax.html [https://perma.cc/CSR9-KG3F] (arguing for repeal of taxes
on menstrual hygiene products and pointing out that these products are unaffordable for many women
even without taxes).
1
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Europe, feminist campaigners pressed the European Commission to scrap
imposition of the Value-Added Tax (VAT) on tampons. 3 Meanwhile, in the
United States, petitions like No Tax on Tampons: Stop Taxing Our Periods!
Period., started by Jennifer Weiss-Wolf of the Brennan Center for Justice at
New York University along with Cosmopolitan Magazine, gained
momentum. That petition has gathered over 71,000 signatures as of June
2018. 4
That the tampon tax movement has gained the attention of a women’s
magazine more known for its focus on fashion and beauty than on political
and feminist issues only illustrates how the movement has pervaded
mainstream consciousness. Professors Bridget Crawford and Carla Spivack
offer four reasons why the tampon tax has attracted global attention, one of
which particularly highlights the intersection of tax and feminism: “the
ability to describe the effects of gender discrimination in simple financial
terms that every woman (and man) can understand.” 5 This Note is situated
in this tax–feminism intersection; it will harness tax law and illustrate critical
tax theory’s “fundamental assumption” that “[t]ax law is political” 6 to further
feminist goals such as equal treatment, encouraging women’s market work,
3

Value-Added Tax in Europe: Freedom Fighters, ECONOMIST (May 14, 2016),
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21698694-reforms-vat-may-lead-moredemocratic-convoluted-system-freedom-fighters [https://perma.cc/WBB4-6HKD] (describing the
tampon tax campaign in Europe). The VAT, sometimes known as a Goods and Services Tax (GST), is a
consumption tax that is common worldwide. See OECD, CONSUMPTION TAX TRENDS: VAT/GST AND
EXCISE RATES, TRENDS AND POLICY ISSUES 2016, at 181–84 (2016) (listing 167 countries operating a
VAT as of 2016). It is functionally similar to a retail sales tax, except that every business in the production
and distribution chain pays a value-added tax, while only retailers pay the tax in the American sales tax
system. See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE
OVER TAXES 195–96 (4th ed. 2008) (explaining VAT taxation scheme). For an explanation of the sales
tax, see infra Section I.A.
4 Jennifer Weiss-Wolf & Cosmopolitan Magazine, No Tax on Tampons: Stop Taxing Our Periods!
Period., CHANGE.ORG, https://www.change.org/p/u-s-state-legislators-stop-taxing-our-periods-period
[https://perma.cc/6X8T-3FJS].
5 Bridget J. Crawford & Carla Spivack, Tampon Taxes, Discrimination, and Human Rights,
2017 WIS. L. REV. 491, 542. Other reasons cited include: “a generational embrace of openness in
discussing women’s bodily functions,” “fast and powerful communication facilitated by the Internet,”
and “the relative ease of finding a solution for discriminatory tax regimes (compared to other forms of
gender discrimination).” Id. For an excellent account of the historical link between menstruation, tampon
taxes, and feminism, see Victoria A. Hartman, Note, End the Bloody Taxation: Seeing Red on the
Unconstitutional Tax on Tampons, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 313, 319–26 (2017). Tampon taxes are not only
a feminist issue, but also a human rights issue. Crawford and Spivack have situated the tampon tax within
the right to be free from discrimination, the right to health, the right to education, the right to work, and
the right to dignity. See Bridget J. Crawford & Carla Spivack, Human Rights and the Taxation of
Menstrual Hygiene Products in an Unequal World, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND TAX IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD
(Philip G. Alston & Nikki Reisch eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2018) (forthcoming 2018) (on file with
Northwestern University Law Review).
6 ANTHONY C. INFANTI & BRIDGET J. CRAWFORD, CRITICAL TAX THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION, at
xxi (2009).
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and assistance to caregivers. 7 The result is an argument for the repeal of the
tampon tax and the institution of a women’s health credit in the United
States.
The tampon tax is a consumption tax, administered in the form of a sales
tax in the United States—or a VAT elsewhere. 8 Thus, the term “tampon tax”
may be misleading, as there is no tax targeted specifically at tampons and
other feminine hygiene products. Rather, these items are simply part of the
sales tax tax base. Nevertheless, most, if not all, tax codes contain
exemptions for certain necessary items, such as groceries or clothing. 9 Since
menstruation is not optional, and items like Viagra or even candy are exempt,
tampons should be considered necessities and not taxed. 10 So the feminist
argument goes.
In response to campaigns against the tampon tax, 11 countries and states
have started taking steps to repeal the tax. For example, prior to its vote to
exit the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK) pushed to change
EU rules that impose a minimum of five percent tax on menstrual hygiene
products. 12 In early 2016, EU leaders signaled support for member states to
scrap the VAT on tampons, 13 but by mid-2016, the EU parliament had voted

7 See infra notes 182–92 and accompanying text for a discussion of these goals, first elucidated by
Anne Alstott.
8 For a discussion of sales tax exemptions, see infra Section II.B.
9 Jared Walczak & Scott Drenkard, State and Local Sales Tax Rates in 2017, 539 TAX FOUND.
FISCAL FACT, Jan. 2017, at 1, 5–6, https://files.taxfoundation.org/20170131121743/TaxFoundationFF539.pdf [https://perma.cc/KUK7-7N7M]; see, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 9741(13) (2017)
(exemption for food); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-8-3(75) (2015) (exemption for clothing).
10 See, e.g., Prachi Gupta, Why the Hell Are Tampons Still Taxed?, COSMOPOLITAN (Oct. 15, 2015),
http://www.cosmopolitan.com/politics/news/a47780/abolish-tampon-tax-america
[https://perma.
cc/E2G4-8WZ7] (comparing tax exemptions in various states); Linda Qiu, Are Pads and Tampons Taxed
but Viagra and Rogaine Not?, PUNDITFACT (Jan. 22, 2017, 3:51 PM), http://www.politifact.
com/punditfact/statements/2017/jan/22/ashley-judd/are-pads-and-tampons-taxed-viagra-and-rogainenot [https://perma.cc/8FXE-RW7U] (discussing Ashley Judd’s comments about taxation of Rogaine and
Viagra versus taxation of menstrual hygiene products). The tampon tax imposes a financial burden, which
can run up to $900 over a woman’s lifetime assuming a sales tax rate of 5%, uniquely on women. See
infra notes 167–74 and accompanying text. That amount does not include the price women have to pay
for the menstrual hygiene products themselves, meaning that many women cannot afford these products
at all. See infra notes 185–87 and accompanying text. As a result, these women may miss school or work.
Id.
11 See, e.g., Weiss-Wolf & Cosmopolitan Magazine, supra note 4 (discussing global movements to
eliminate national taxes on menstrual products).
12 Vince Chadwick, UK Targets EU ‘Tampon Tax,’ POLITICO (published Oct. 28, 2015, 10:52 AM;
updated Oct. 28, 2015, 6:22 PM), http://www.politico.eu/article/tampon-tax-eu-news-uk-mp-tory-labour
[https://perma.cc/2FTH-NBLC].
13 Deal Reached to Scrap ‘Tampon Tax’, Officials Say, BBC NEWS (Mar. 17, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-35834142 [https://perma.cc/S6Y6-PYB4].
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against such proposals. 14 Thus, EU countries continue to impose taxes on
tampons ranging from five percent to over twenty percent, 15 as the UK
continues to press for reform by tacking tampons onto a pending EU proposal
to lower VAT rates on e-books and digital publications. 16
There has been some progress in the United States toward the repeal of
the tampon tax. Reform has mostly happened at the state and local level
because sales taxes are imposed either by states at the state level or by
municipalities. Since 2016, New York, 17 Illinois, 18 Connecticut, 19 and
Florida 20 have passed legislation to provide sales tax exemptions for tampon
purchases. Cities like Chicago 21 and Washington, D.C. 22 have also done the

14 Anger as EU Rejects Tampon Tax Reduction, GAZETTE (BLACKPOOL) (May 28, 2016, 7:00 AM),
http://www.blackpoolgazette.co.uk/news/anger-as-eu-rejects-tampon-tax-reduction-1-7935982
[https://perma.cc/G2UW-VF4M].
15 Value-Added Tax in Europe: Freedom Fighters, supra note 3.
16 Joe Kirwin, EU VAT E-Book Plan Snagged Over U.K. Sanitary Product Demands, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.bna.com/eu-vat-ebook-n57982083673 [https://perma.cc/3GN6N8TJ].
17 Governor Cuomo Signs Legislation to Exempt Sales and Use Taxes on Feminine Hygiene
Products, N.Y. STATE (July 21, 2016), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-signslegislation-exempt-sales-and-use-taxes-feminine-hygiene-products [https://perma.cc/A837-Z6LW]; see
N.Y. TAX LAW § 1115(a)(3-a) (McKinney 2017) (“Receipts from the following shall be exempt from the
tax on retail sales: . . . [f]eminine hygiene products, including, but not limited to, sanitary napkins,
tampons and panty liners.”).
18 Natalie Wickman, State’s ‘Tampon Tax’ Going Away Sunday, NEWS-GAZETTE (Dec. 29, 2016,
8:00
AM),
http://www.news-gazette.com/news/local/2016-12-29/states-tampon-tax-going-awaysunday.html [https://perma.cc/Z3F3-3KS7]; see 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/3-5(37) (2018) (“Use of the
following tangible personal property is exempt from the tax imposed by this Act: . . . menstrual pads,
tampons, and menstrual cups.”).
19 Rachel Treisman, State Pushes to Eliminate Tampon Tax, YALE DAILY NEWS (Mar. 3, 2016, 2:59
AM),
http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2016/03/03/state-pushes-to-eliminate-tampon-tax
[https://
perma.cc/D24A-W5YB]; see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-412(122) (West 2018) (“Taxes imposed by
this chapter shall not apply to the gross receipts from . . . [s]ales of feminine hygiene products.”).
20 Catherine Pearson, Florida Just Became the Latest State to Abolish the ‘Tampon Tax,’
HUFFINGTON POST (May 26, 2017, 11:14 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/florida-justbecame-the-latest-state-to-abolish-the-tampon-tax_us_59282d4de4b0df34c35b77cf [https://perma.cc/
AQ46-CXAF]; see FLA. STAT. § 212.08(7)(nnn) (2018).
21 Celeste Bott, Lawmakers Vote to Eliminate Tampon Tax,’ Expand Contraceptive Options, CHI.
TRIB. (Apr. 21, 2016, 6:28 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-illinoislegislature-tampon-tax-met-0421-20160421-story.html [https://perma.cc/TN9G-BZFC]; see CHI., ILL.,
MUN. CODE § 3-40-010(b)(ii) (2018) (“The tax imposed by this section shall not be applicable to or
imposed upon sales of the following items: . . . medical appliances including, but not limited to, tampons
and sanitary napkins, and insulin, urine testing materials, syringes and needles used by diabetics.”).
22 Fenit Nirappil, D.C. to Lift Sales Tax on Diapers, Tampons, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/dc-to-lift-sales-tax-on-diapers-tampons/2016/11/17/
5cc5f634-aceb-11e6-8b45-f8e493f06fcd_story.html [https://perma.cc/F244-PSD6]; see also Feminine
Hygiene and Diaper Sales Tax Exemption Amendment Act of 2016, 2016 D.C. Laws 21-201 (Act 21557) (feminine hygiene and diaper sales tax exemptions). The exemption has not yet gone into effect due
to problems with funding. See D.C. CODE § 47-2005(38) (2018).
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same, and New York City went even further by funding the provision of
menstrual hygiene products in homeless shelters and public schools. 23 At
least thirteen states considered repeal of taxes on feminine hygiene products
in 2016. 24 The issue has only grown in prominence since then; in 2017, New
York Congresswoman Grace Meng introduced the Menstrual Equity for All
Act of 2017, which would, among other things, provide a refundable tax
credit to low-income women and require prisons and large employers to
provide feminine hygiene products. 25 As of August 2018, the bill is in several
committees. 26
At the same time, the calls for reform have also prompted some
criticism and backlash. Some commentators have pointed out that the
tampon tax “is [a] sales tax that, in most states, applies to tampons,” rather
than “an obvious and pressing instance of discrimination.” 27 Others note that
state sales tax laws are complicated, and although they exempt some

23 Christina Cauterucci, New York City Council Approves Free Tampons and Pads in Schools,
Prisons, and Shelters, SLATE (June 22, 2016, 5:50 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2016/06/
22/new_york_city_council_votes_to_give_free_tampons_and_pads_to_women_in_schools.html
[https://perma.cc/M59C-KVSC]; see N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 9-141 (2017) (“All female
individuals arrested and detained in the custody of the department for at least 48 hours shall be provided,
at the department’s expense, with feminine hygiene products as soon as practicable upon request.”); id.
§ 12-207(b) (“The department of citywide administrative services shall make available to agencies
operating or having oversight of providers operating temporary shelters a supply of feminine hygiene
products sufficient to meet the needs of residents. The department shall also make available a supply of
feminine hygiene products sufficient to meet the needs of youth in secure detention facilities operated by
the administration for children’s services, as well as youth in congregate care facilities operated by the
administration for children’s services who are awaiting placement with a licensed foster care agency.”);
id. § 21-968(b) (“The department shall make feminine hygiene products available at no cost to students
in bathrooms of school buildings.”).
24 Nicole Kaeding, Tampon Taxes: Do Feminine Hygiene Products Deserve a Sales Tax Exemption?,
FOUND.
FISCAL
FACT,
Apr.
2017,
at
1,
5
n.10,
547
TAX
https://files.taxfoundation.org/20170425105103/Tax-Foundation-FF547.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2JM8RQFB] (California, Connecticut, Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin).
25 Press Release, Grace Meng, U.S. Rep., Meng Renews Effort to Make Menstrual Hygiene Products
More Accessible and Affordable to Women (Feb. 13, 2017), https://meng.house.gov/media-center/pressreleases/meng-renews-effort-to-make-menstrual-hygiene-products-more-accessible
[https://perma.cc/MQ9V-M3RP].
26 All
Actions:
H.R.972
—
115th
Congress
(2017–2018),
CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/972/all-actions
[https://perma.cc/6CYN8NKQ]. This bill combines bills that Congresswoman Meng introduced in 2015 and 2016. See, e.g.,
Menstrual Products Tax Credit Act of 2016, H.R. 5917, 114th Cong. (2016); Menstrual Products for
Employees Act of 2016, H.R. 5915, 114th Cong. (2016); Fund Essential Menstruation Products Act of
2015, H.R. 3117, 114th Cong. (2015).
27 See, e.g., Samantha Allen, The ‘Tampon Tax’ Outrage Is Overblown, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 22, 2015,
1:00
AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/10/22/the-tampon-tax-outrage-isoverblown.html [https://perma.cc/G2HE-6JFF].
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necessities, “[t]here is no hard and fast rule.” 28 One Washington Post
opinion-editorial calls the tampon tax movement a “fraud,” and argues that
tax rates on other products would have to be raised in order to cover the lost
tax revenue. 29
Regardless of these criticisms, this Note argues that a tax on menstrual
hygiene products is facially discriminatory against women and thus must be
repealed, despite traditional tax design concerns. 30 Repeal, however, is only
half the battle. As a method of redistribution, the tax system can—and,
depending on our philosophical convictions of what a just society means,
should—be used to remedy sex inequality. 31 Providing a women’s health
credit to all women of menstruating age is one step toward equalizing relative
levels of welfare between men and women and will end menstrual inequity. 32
Although the tampon tax movement has gained attention worldwide,
the scope of this Note will be confined to United States-centric reform.
Accordingly, Part I offers a gloss on the sales tax system in the United States.
It also canvasses legislative and legal responses to the tampon tax movement,
providing more in-depth information on the state repeals and the Menstrual
Equity for All Act of 2017. Part II then responds to common arguments
against ending the tampon tax, and shows that because the tampon tax
constitutes gender discrimination and violates traditional principles of tax
equity, it cannot be justified. Building on this theoretical argument, Part III
assesses the various actions already taken or currently being considered in
response to the tampon tax and proposes that repeal combined with a
women’s health tax credit is the best solution. In so doing, this Note
differentiates itself from existing scholarship on the tampon tax, which is

28 See, e.g., Brooke Rogers, No, the Government Isn’t Taxing Your Period, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 15,
2016, 2:12 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/434103/tampon-tax-feminist-issue-du-jour
[https://perma.cc/FHP9-Q24V].
29 Catherine Rampell,
The ‘Tampon Tax’ Fraud, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-tampon-tax-fraud/2016/01/25/fb9c7e68-c3a8-11e58965-0607e0e265ce_story.html [https://perma.cc/T3ZH-MLXV].
30 See infra Section II.B.
31 See infra notes 261–62 and accompanying text.
32 One easily identifiable example of a different level of welfare between men and women is the
gender pay gap. As of 2017, women ages 25 to 34 earned only eighty-nine cents for every dollar men
earned; the gap was larger for workers ages 16 and older. See Nikki Graf, Anna Brown & Eileen Patten,
The Narrowing, but Persistent, Gender Gap in Pay, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 9, 2018),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/04/09/gender-pay-gap-facts
[https://perma.cc/GX7A6TXN]. While the gap likely has various causes, gender discrimination could be a contributing factor. If
so, the tax system could be a useful method to remedy this structural gender inequity. See infra notes
255–64 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of this topic.
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largely focused on repeal. 33 This Note is the first to evaluate tampon taxes
from a tax policy perspective and to suggest a solution consistent with sound
taxation principles.
I.

BACKGROUND AND RESPONSES TO THE TAMPON TAX

The outcry over the tampon tax has prompted varied responses. The
primary response has been to seek to repeal the tax, which in effect means
creating an exemption for menstrual hygiene products from the broader sales
tax, although such attempts are not always successful. However, there have
been some notable exceptions: the free tampons program in New York City
and the Menstrual Equity for All Act of 2017. Prior to evaluating these
responses, Section A first explains the concepts of a sales tax and exemptions
from the tax base. Section B proceeds by evaluating the various legislative
responses to tampon taxes in other jurisdictions, and Section C looks to
judicial responses, such as a notable Illinois case regarding the tampon tax
that was litigated in the 1980s. Overall, repeal, rather than judicial action,
appears to be the dominant solution proposed by most activists, which raises
tensions with tax design and policy that will be discussed more fully in Part
II.
A. How a Sales Tax Works
A retail sales tax is one form of a consumption tax. 34 Under the retail
sales tax, businesses remit tax on all sales of goods and services to consumers
but not on sales of input goods and services to other businesses.35 A
consumption tax, in turn, means that the tax base—i.e., what is taxed—is
consumption, or the use of goods and services. 36 Thus, the tampon tax simply
means that the use of tampons is being taxed.
In the United States, sales taxes are imposed on both the state and local
levels. 37 Currently, there is no national sales tax, although proposals to shift
the federal tax base from income to consumption have periodically been

33 See Crawford & Spivack, Tampon Taxes, Discrimination, and Human Rights, supra note 5, at 546
(identifying repeal as a clear legal remedy); Hartman, supra note 5, at 326–38 (focusing on legislative
and court-based efforts).
34 In European countries, where the tampon tax has attracted a lot of attention, a sales tax is
administered in the functionally similar form of a value-added tax. See supra note 3 and accompanying
text for an explanation of the VAT.
35 SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 3, at 232. Input goods and services are those that are used or
transformed in the production process. See id. at 196.
36 Id. at 195.
37 Walczak & Drenkard, supra note 9, at 1.
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made. 38 As of 2017, a state sales tax is collected in forty-five states and the
District of Columbia. 39 Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and
Oregon are the outliers—these states do not collect a sales tax on the state
level. 40 State sales taxes range from a high of 7.25% in California to a low of
2.9% in Colorado. 41 In addition to the state sales tax, local sales taxes are
also imposed in areas of thirty-eight states. 42
Sales taxes are, despite their appearances, generally regressive. A pure
consumption tax taxes “everyone a fixed amount on the consumption
dollar.” 43 Because of this identical treatment, sales taxes appear fair. Sales
taxes, however, actually have regressive distributional consequences.
Regressivity means that “the share of income paid in taxes falls with
income.” 44 Because high-income individuals are able to save higher
proportions of their income, low-income individuals will almost always pay
a larger portion of their income in sales taxes than do higher-income
individuals. Because lower-income individuals bear a larger proportional
burden of the tax, a sales tax is regressive.
That being said, it is true that “a consumption tax could have any degree
of progressivity whatever” if the tax is designed to include an exemption for
essentials or a cash transfer to people below a certain income. 45 Perhaps
because of the disproportionate impact of the sales tax on low-income
people, 46 most states exempt certain “necessary”—as opposed to “luxury”—
items, such as food and prescription medication, from the sales tax base. 47
As one court put it, a Pennsylvania tax law exempting the purchase of food
and beverages from grocery stores, but not from restaurants or cafes,
“demonstrates a definite mandate to exclude the purchase of life’s necessities
from the assessment of sales tax.” 48 The same court noted that sales taxes are
imposed on purchases of prepared or packaged food and beverages because

38 E.g., William G. Gale, The National Retail Sales Tax: What Would the Rate Have to Be?, 107 TAX
NOTES 889 (2005) (discussing a Bush-era legislative proposal to impose a national retail sales tax).
39 Walczak & Drenkard, supra note 9, at 1.
40 Id. at 2.
41 Id. at 3.
42 Id. at 1.
43 LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 100 (2002).
44 Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, How Progressive Is the U.S. Federal Tax System? A Historical
and International Perspective, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4 (2007).
45 MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 43, at 96.
46 JANE GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HJ5700, GENERAL SALES TAX RATES, FOOD
EXEMPTIONS AND SALES TAX CREDITS, WITH A PRO AND CON ANALYSIS 5 (1972).
47 See, e.g., Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Sales and Use Tax Exemption for Medical Supplies,
30 A.L.R.5th 494 (1995) (collecting exemptions from the sales tax for medical supplies).
48 CRH Catering Co. v. Commonwealth, 521 A.2d 497, 500 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
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those are “a luxury.” 49 Some scholars, however, have also suggested that
sales taxes (and exemptions) in the United States are “seemingly
impose[d] . . . wherever political expediency dictates.” 50
Exemptions from the tax base raise various issues of tax design.
Exemptions create issues of interpretation—as Professors Joel Slemrod and
Jon Bakija put it, “[w]henever some commodities are exempt from tax,
where the line is drawn is important.” 51 Moreover, exemptions narrow the
tax base and result in lost revenues. 52 And exemptions muddy the tax base
by creating distortions and raising costs overall. 53 Specifically, exemptions
create an incentive to consume more of the untaxed goods and less of other
taxed goods, even when it might be more efficient for one to consume the
taxed goods. 54 That inefficiency represents an additional cost. These
problems will be more extensively explored in Part II. Despite these
inefficiencies, as the rest of this Part shows, most responses to the tampon
tax movement have been confined to one action: repeal.
B. Legislative Responses
As the feminist movement to repeal the tampon tax has risen in
prominence in recent years, legislators in some states have responded in kind
by repealing the tampon tax and, in some cases, going further to provide free
menstrual hygiene products or propose alternative ways to help women pay
for such products. This Section collects the various actions lawmakers have
taken in relation to the tampon tax, most of which are focused on repealing
the tampon tax.
Of the states that impose a statewide sales tax, five states already
“repealed their sales tax on” tampons and similar feminine hygiene products
before 2016: Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and New
Jersey. 55 Thus, it cannot be said that the recent movement to end the tampon
tax 56 has spurred the exemption in those states. As noted above, however,
some states, including New York, Illinois, and Connecticut, have passed
legislation to exempt tampons from sales taxes. 57 And other states are taking
49
50

Id.
See, e.g., Crawford & Spivack, Tampon Taxes, Discrimination, and Human Rights, supra note 5,

at 500.
51 SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 3, at 246. That is, legislatures must determine which products or
services fit into a particular exemption.
52 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
53 MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 43, at 125.
54 SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 3, at 218.
55 Crawford & Spivack, Tampon Taxes, Discrimination, and Human Rights, supra note 5, at 535.
56 See supra Introduction for a discussion of the recent campaigns against the tampon tax.
57 See supra notes 17–24 and accompanying text.
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heed of the wave of viral legislation: Colorado, 58 Texas, 59 and Wisconsin,60
among others, 61 are considering or have considered an end to the tax on
tampons. The feminist movement appears to be impactful in spurring
legislative change, at least in the form of a repeal.
The campaign to repeal the tampon tax is very much a grassroots
movement that has garnered support from both sides of the aisle. Illinois is a
good example of how a municipality and state approached the tampon tax
issue. The City of Chicago led the charge by abolishing the tampon tax in
March 2016. 62 State lawmakers quickly followed suit; in August 2016, when
Republican Governor Bruce Rauner signed the repeal bill into law, Illinois
became the third state that year to repeal the tampon tax.63 In a statement
during deliberations that harkens back to the rhetoric of necessity that guides
exemptions from the sales tax base, 64 Democratic State Senator Melinda

58 See Blair Miller & Jaclyn Allen, Colorado Bill That Would Exempt State from ‘Tampon Tax’
Passes First Committee, DENVER CHANNEL (published Feb. 13, 2017, 5:37 PM; updated Feb. 13, 2017,
10:37 PM), http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/politics/colorado-bill-that-would-exempt-statefrom-tampon-tax-passes-first-committee [https://perma.cc/WL9K-AJKA].
59 See Madlin Mekelburg, Texas Lawmakers Want to Help Women by Removing the Tampon Tax,
‘Period,’ DALL. MORNING NEWS (Dec. 26, 2016), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/texas-legislature/
2016/12/26/texas-lawmakers-want-help-women-removing-tampon-tax-period [https://perma.cc/GQH974SC]. Unfortunately, the bills remained stuck in committee and were not heard during the 2017
legislative session. Jackie Wang, Bills Exempting Tampons from Texas Sales Tax Went Nowhere This
Session, TEX. TRIB. (May 24, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/05/24/tampon-taxbills-stalled-due-legislators-reluctance-lose-tax-revenue [https://perma.cc/RVJ2-CZLG].
60 Meg Jones, Wisconsin Legislator Aims to Get Rid of State’s ‘Tampon Tax,’ MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL (published Mar. 25, 2017, 3:42 PM; updated Mar. 25, 2017, 9:48 PM),
http://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2017/03/25/wisconsin-legislator-aims-get-rid-statestampon-tax/99222076 [https://perma.cc/A9MG-8QZ7].
61 After the governor of California, Jerry Brown, vetoed a bill repealing the tampon tax,
Assemblywoman Christina Garcia reintroduced the bill. State Assemb. 9, 2017–2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2017). However, the fiscal committee of the California legislature delayed the bill until 2018.
John Myers, The Effort to Make Tampons Tax Free in California Has Been Delayed Until 2018, L.A.
TIMES (May 26, 2017, 12:58 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politicsupdates-the-effort-to-make-tampons-tax-free-in-1495827774-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/MCE4DH6P]. In 2018, the reinvigorated bill died in committee. Liam Dillon, Effort to Make Tampons Tax-free
TIMES
(Jan.
18,
2018,
12:23
PM),
in
California
Fails
Again,
L.A.
http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-california-tampon-taxexemption-fails-1516307419-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/EA84-GAJ3]. Interestingly, Nevada
legislators punted the issue to voters, putting a measure on the November 2018 ballot that will ask
Nevadans whether the tax should be repealed. Ramona Giwargis, 5 Measures Will Be on 2018 Ballot in
Nevada, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Jan. 18, 2018, 7:11 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/politicsand-government/nevada/5-measures-will-be-on-2018-ballot-in-nevada [https://perma.cc/YX77-95G6].
62 Bott, supra note 21.
63 Illinois Becomes Third State to Eliminate ‘Tampon Tax,’ N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 19, 2016, 6:52
PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/illinois-state-eliminate-tampon-tax-article-1.2758527
[https://perma.cc/YU2J-4HX8]; see also 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/3-5(37) (2018).
64 See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text for a discussion of sales tax exemptions.
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Bush, who sponsored the bill in the Illinois Senate, noted that menstrual
hygiene products are “taxed as luxury items, but all women know that
periods are not a luxury[.]” 65 According to State Senator Bush, the tampon
tax “unfairly targets women for a product they are literally biologically
incapable of avoiding.” 66
The reform does not come cheap—the Illinois Committee on
Government Forecasting and Accountability estimates that Illinois residents
spend $14.7 million on menstrual hygiene products annually, 67 translating to
about $1 million in lost tax dollars at the state tax rate of 6.25%. 68 But this
number has to be considered in the larger context of the Illinois sales tax
system, which is expected to rake in nearly $8.2 billion in 2017. 69 The lost
revenue from abolishing the tampon tax seems like a drop in the bucket when
compared to such an astronomical number (less than 0.02%!); this may also
explain why both local and state authorities have moved so quickly to change
the law in Illinois. There is little lost, and the repeal could be framed as a
low-cost, easy, bipartisan win. Thus, it will not be surprising if similar efforts
sweep the nation in the coming months, assuming there is sufficient political
will from state legislators to resist the objections of fiscal conservatives and
to take a pro-feminist stance. Of course, as demonstrated by failed attempts
to repeal the tax in several states, 70 the political will may not be easy to
muster.
Indeed, it is probably because of the simplicity and clarity of the
solution that the tampon tax movement has attracted so much attention. As
Professors Crawford and Spivack point out, “To the ordinary consumer, the
solution . . . is straightforward: repeal it.” 71 But is it ever so simple?
Crawford and Spivack argue it is not; according to them, the tampon tax is
“only a smaller (and mostly Westernized) part of a larger problem of
menstrual hygiene.” 72 And they are right; in many parts of the world, young
girls and women do not have access to clean water or sanitation for their

65

Press Release, Melinda Bush, Ill. State Senator, Periods Are Not a Luxury: End the Unfair Tax on
Tampons (Mar. 10, 2016, 9:01 AM), http://www.senatormelindabush.com/news/17-press-releases/171end-the-tampon-tax-periods-are-not-a-luxury [https://perma.cc/7NSK-VCMY].
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/3-10 (2018) (imposing a rate of “6.25% of either the selling price or the
fair market value”).
69 BRUCE RAUNER, GOVERNOR, ILLINOIS STATE BUDGET: FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 131 (2017),
https://www.illinois.gov/gov/budget/Documents/Budget%20Book/FY2018%20Budget%20Book/FY20
18OperatingBudgetBook.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5H9-FPWK].
70 See infra notes 131–33 and accompanying text.
71 Crawford & Spivack, Tampon Taxes, Discrimination, and Human Rights, supra note 5, at 546.
72 Id. at 547.
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menstrual needs, let alone commercial products like tampons or sanitary
napkins. 73 Although my claim takes a more U.S.-centric perspective, it is
essentially similar: repeal is only half of the solution, and more needs to be
done to remedy gender inequities brought on by menstruation. The tax
system is the best redistributive tool for this goal and should be used to
provide a demogrant 74 to all women of menstruating age as a way of reducing
the financial burdens of menstruation.
Although repeal has been the dominant form of change, there are some
notable exceptions. First, the New York City Council appears to have taken
the campaign slogan “Free the Tampons” 75 quite literally. The Council
recently passed a legislative package providing free tampons and sanitary
napkins in public schools and homeless shelters, 76 making New York City
“the first city in the nation to proactively guarantee access to menstrual
hygiene products.” 77 The law also requires jails to provide such products “as
soon as practicable” upon request. 78 The New York City approach is
significant because it goes further than repealing the tampon tax at the local
level by providing free tampons and sanitary napkins and is thus an example
of how repeal might be coupled with other reforms. 79 It also raises an
73

Id.
A demogrant is a cash transfer given out to individuals who meet specified criteria. See Joseph
Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive
Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1905, 1908 (1987).
75 See
About,
FREE
THE
TAMPONS,
http://www.freethetampons.org/about.html
[https://perma.cc/KU69-L6ZJ] (foundation advocating for the provision of free tampons in every
bathroom).
76 Provision of Feminine Hygiene Products in Schools, N.Y. CITY COUNCIL (July 13, 2016), http://
legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2637114&GUID=834E4DFC-7F14-4E1E-812F2CD862A4FC1D&Options=ID%7cText%7c&Search=feminine+hygiene
[https://perma.cc/Q6UFGZZY].
77 Sarah Ruiz-Grossman, NYC Mayor Signs Free Tampons for Schools, Jails, Shelters into Law,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 14, 2016, 3:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/new-york-citymayor-bill-de-blasio-signs-tampons-free-law_us_5787bc57e4b08608d3336b27 [https://perma.cc/24ET935M].
78 Requiring that the DOC Issue Feminine Hygiene Products to Inmates, N.Y. CITY COUNCIL (July
13, 2016), http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2637117&GUID=4D97B9EE4986-4B87-B846-2E52A329695A&Options=ID|Text|&Search=feminine+hygiene
[https://perma.cc/E75H-76GW]. It is unclear what “as soon as practicable” means in practice. Conditions
in prisons are woefully undignified for women, with documented instances of access to tampons being
removed as punishment. See Complaint at 1, Semelbauer v. Muskegon Cty., 2015 WL 9906265 (W.D.
Mich. Sept. 11, 2015) (No. 1:14-CV-1245) (alleging prison did not provide adequate menstrual hygiene
products). It remains to be seen how effective this law will be in protecting prisoners’ rights.
79 Even at the White House, tampons have not been easily accessible, at least until recently. Alyssa
Mastromonaco, a senior female staffer during the Obama Administration, had to request a tampon
dispenser in the women’s bathroom in the West Wing. Tierney McAfee, How the White House Got Its
First Tampon Machine and Other Tales from an Obama West Wing Insider, PEOPLE (Mar. 15, 2017, 6:50
PM),
http://people.com/politics/obama-staffer-alyssa-mastromonaco-new-book-white-house
74
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interesting question about how broader reform might be implemented. The
text of the bills refer to “female” students, 80 inmates, and arrestees, 81 while a
press release from Mayor Bill de Blasio’s office suggests that transgender,
intersex, and gender nonconforming residents of city shelters and Children’s
Services facilities will also benefit from free access. 82 The dissonance
implicates a question of tax design, to be explored in Part III, regarding
which groups should benefit from a particular tax reform.
A second exception to a straightforward repeal approach is
Congresswoman Grace Meng’s Menstrual Equity for All Act of 2017. Like
its New York City counterpart, this bill, H.R. 972, would condition the
receipt of federal funds by states on the provision of menstrual hygiene
products to female inmates. 83 It would also make menstrual hygiene
products, including tampons, pads, liners, and cups, qualified medical
expenses that can be paid for with funds from a health savings account
(HSA). 84 Unfortunately, not everyone has an HSA, 85 as only individuals with
high-deductible health plans are eligible.86 There is also no requirement that

[https://perma.cc/86W8-GCT5]. Barring cost concerns associated with the administrative complexities of
supplying menstruation products to the masses, the problem of access can be as simple as providing a
tampon dispenser. See infra notes 213–16 and accompanying text for further discussion of these
complexities. To be clear, any of the proposed solutions—including the menstrual health credit—would
have administrative costs. The tax credit, however, would have fewer such costs because it utilizes the
pre-existing tax framework. See infra text accompanying note 242.
80 N.Y. CITY COUNCIL, supra note 76.
81 N.Y. CITY COUNCIL, supra note 78.
82 Mayor de Blasio Signs Legislation Increasing Access to Feminine Hygiene Products for Students,
Shelter Residents and Inmates, CITY OF N.Y. (July 13, 2016), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-themayor/news/611-16/mayor-de-blasio-signs-legislation-increasing-access-feminine-hygiene-productsstudents [https://perma.cc/S5G4-5X79] [hereinafter de Blasio Press Release].
83 Menstrual Equity for All Act of 2017, H.R. 972, 115th Cong. (2017).
84 Id. An HSA is a tax-advantaged account owned by an eligible individual. Robin Fisk, Patient
Financial Responsibility Under High Deductible Health Plans: What Providers Can & Can’t Do If the
Patient Can’t Pay, 18 HEALTH LAW. 16, 16 (2006). Pre-tax contributions to the HSA grow tax-free and
are also exempt from tax when spent on “qualified medical expenses.” Id. Thus, the HSA has three unique
tax advantages—contributions, growth, and withdrawal are all tax-free. See id. Representative Meng
sponsored a similar provision in H.R. 6199, which recently passed the House. See Restoring Access to
Medication and Modernizing Health Savings Accounts Act of 2018, H.R. 6199, 115th Cong. (2018); see
also Nicole Gaudiano, “Menstrual Equality”: House Passes Measure Allowing Women to Buy Tampons,
TODAY
(July
27,
2018),
Pads
with
Health
Spending
Accounts,
USA
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/07/27/house-oks-menstrual-equality-measure-helpwomen-buy-tampons-pads/849074002 [https://perma.cc/RX82-LK9K].
85 A survey of fifty-nine health insurance plans reports that 20.2 million people enrolled in health
savings account/high-deductible health plans. AMERICA’S HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS, 2016 SURVEY OF
HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNT – HIGH DEDUCTIBLE HEALTH PLANS 2 (2017), https://www.ahip.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/02/2016_HSASurvey_Draft_2.14.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9WA-TDFD].
86 Fisk, supra note 84, at 16.
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eligible individuals have an HSA. 87 This provision of the bill will therefore
benefit only the small subsection of the population that has HSAs.
A more impactful provision of H.R. 972 would provide a $120
refundable tax credit for low-income users of menstrual hygiene products.88
Past a certain income threshold, the amount of the credit would be zero; in
other words, the tax credit phases out for high-income users. 89 This means
that taxpayers with no tax liability would receive a lump sum payment—
hence the term “refundable”—akin to a negative income tax. 90
Representative Meng’s proposed credit is different from other current
refundable credits in that it is not designed to induce or change certain
behavior. For example, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), 91 which is a
fully refundable credit for low-income families and individuals, is meant to
“increase work participation among low-income households by reducing the
work disincentives created by means-tested transfer programs.” 92 This is
because the credit is “conditioned on working.” 93 In contrast, the menstrual
hygiene tax credit does not have any behavioral incentives; it is a
redistributive program more focused on equity than changing behavior.
Indeed, as Representative Meng asks, “Most Americans—across all income
levels—believe that feminine hygiene products are basic necessities. So why
is it still so hard to afford and access them?” 94
One commentator has argued that “[a] woman’s reproductive health and
access to Reproductive Justice, in addition to her economic stability, cannot
and should not depend on the state in which she lives.” 95 In her Note, Abigail
Durkin correctly points out that the economic burden on women remains
even if tampon taxes were repealed. 96 Accordingly, Durkin suggests that the
87

Id.
Menstrual Equity for All Act of 2017, H.R. 972, 115th Cong. § 3(a) (2017) (“There shall be
allowed as a credit against the tax imposed by this subtitle with respect to each eligible individual for
whom the taxpayer is allowed a deduction under section 151 an amount equal to $120.”). The $120 credit
is subject to inflation and cost-of-living adjustments. Id.
89 Id.
90 See Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. & Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency and Tax Incentives:
The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 32 (2006) (likening refundable credits to
negative income taxes).
91 I.R.C. § 32 (2012).
92 Batchelder, Goldberg & Orszag, supra note 90, at 35.
93 Id. at 34.
94 Grace Meng, Our Laws Period-Shame Women—So I’m Going to Change Them, MARIE CLAIRE
(Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.marieclaire.com/politics/news/a25464/congresswoman-grace-mengmenstrual-equity-bill [https://perma.cc/Q6BZ-NNJX].
95 Abigail Durkin, Note, Profitable Menstruation: How the Cost of Feminine Hygiene Products Is a
Battle Against Reproductive Justice, 18 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 131, 135–36 (2017).
96 Id. at 135 (“[E]ven if the tax were removed, an economic burden still remains, as one must still
purchase the products at their regular cost.”).
88
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federal government preempt states by passing “legislation forbidding states
to tax feminine hygiene products.” 97 Durkin further calls for feminine
hygiene products to be included under the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) and Women, Infants, and Children (WIC)
benefits. 98 Another solution proposed by Durkin is to include feminine
hygiene products within the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) contraception
mandate, such that the insurer pays for feminine hygiene products without
any cost-sharing with the insured. 99 These are creative solutions that can be
implemented within existing frameworks such as SNAP, WIC, and ACA.
But they ignore the fact that while low-income women are the ones hardest
hit by the financial burdens of menstruation, the fundamental problem is
gender inequity. Remedying the problem for only a subset of women, then,
seems incomplete.
Save these three exceptions, legislative responses have been focused on
repealing the tampon tax. Beyond repeal, New York City’s, Representative
Meng’s, and Durkin’s approaches are unique, novel proposals in the fight for
menstrual equity, and deserve a deeper look. Parts II and III will take up this
challenge and assess the advantages and disadvantages of each approach.
C. Legal Responses
In addition to legislative responses, there have been multiple legal
challenges to various tampon taxes. One early challenge to the tampon tax
arose in the 1980s with the filing of a class action lawsuit by three female
consumers in Illinois. In Geary v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc., the
plaintiffs alleged that state and local sales taxes had been “illegally collected
on the sale of tampons and sanitary napkins.” 100 While the case was pending,
the state changed its interpretation of the “medical appliances” exemption to
include tampons and sanitary napkins, rendering the plaintiffs’ injunctive
claim regarding the applicability of the state’s tax moot. 101 The claims for an
injunction against the city and for restitution of paid taxes from the state and
city continued.
The appellate court ruled that the plaintiffs had no standing to seek
restitution because they had not protested the payment of sales taxes during

97

Id. at 155.
Id. at 157–59. Durkin argues that this approach would easily increase access to menstrual hygiene
products for low-income women. Id.
99 Id. at 164–65. According to Durkin, causing insurers to fully subsidize menstrual hygiene products
would increase access to these products and thus improve reproductive health. See id.
100 520 N.E.2d 968, 968 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988), rev’d, 544 N.E.2d 344 (Ill. 1989).
101 Id. at 969.
98
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purchase and did not pay the taxes under threat. 102 Therefore, the plaintiffs
did not act under duress and accordingly could not recover due to the
voluntary payment doctrine, 103 which states that “taxes paid voluntarily,
though erroneously, may not be recovered without statutory
authorization.” 104 Because the court concluded that the plaintiffs had no
standing, it did not reach the question of whether tampons and sanitary
napkins were medical necessities and thus exempt from the city sales tax.
The state supreme court reversed, holding that the plaintiffs sufficiently
pled duress by claiming that tampons and sanitary napkins are necessities. 105
The court noted that “[c]learly tampons and sanitary napkins are necessities
of life for a vast number of post-pubescent women. . . . Certainly if
telephones and electricity are necessities, tampons and sanitary napkins,
which were created to absorb the consequences which flow from a natural
biological process, are necessities.” 106 The court also held that tampons and
sanitary napkins are “medical appliances” and thus exempted from the city
sales tax. 107 The classification turned on the court’s reasoning that tampons
and sanitary napkins have absorbent purposes similar to band aids and
cotton, which are explicitly considered “medical appliances” by the city, and
are “used by many post-surgical patients of both sexes and all ages.” 108
The Geary saga is significant for four reasons. First, it is emblematic of
the rhetoric of necessity that has permeated the current feminist movement
to repeal the tampon tax. Women’s choices are either to pay the tax or do
without tampons, and that is no real choice at all, because they need tampons
in order to continue their everyday lives. As Representative Meng has
pointed out, some girls skip school during their periods if they are unable to
access pads or tampons. 109 But if we accept the idea that menstrual hygiene
products are necessary in order for women to live productive lives, then it
seems much too incomplete to simply repeal the tampon tax, because lowincome women may not be able to afford these products in the first place.
Second, Geary highlights a framing issue. Are periods a disease, or a
normal bodily function? Feminists would cringe at the suggestion that their

102

Id. at 970–71.
Id. at 971.
104 Id. at 969 (quoting Hagerty v. Gen. Motors Corp., 319 N.E.2d 5, 8 (Ill. 1974)).
105 Geary v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc., 544 N.E.2d 344, 353 (Ill. 1989).
106 Id. at 348–49.
107 Id. at 355.
108 Id. at 355. In contrast, the defendants had argued that menstruation is not a disease or illness but
rather a normal bodily function. Id.
109 Meng, supra note 94.
103
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sex is an illness, a crippling disease that needs to be managed or cured.110
Yet, as the Geary defendants argued, 111 if periods are not a disease or illness,
then they cannot rightly be considered medical appliances if the medical
appliance exemption is meant for items that correct a functioning part of the
body. In turn, this means that excluding menstrual hygiene products from the
sales tax would either require framing periods as an illness or finding a
different statutory exemption or justification for the exclusion.
Third, Geary and subsequent events illustrate the slow pace of change.
After the Illinois Supreme Court issued its decision and remanded the case
to lower courts, Illinois and the City of Chicago continued to tax tampons
and sanitary napkins until the repeal of the tax at both levels in 2016. 112 Thus,
although the tampon tax movement has gained ground in the past few years,
any proposed solution moving forward needs to be practicable and to
continuously galvanize the voter base.
Fourth, and most importantly, Geary and similar legal challenges to the
tampon tax illustrate the inadequacy of the legal remedy. That is, courts can
only strike down the tampon tax but cannot implement more wide-ranging
and impactful measures to resolve the problem of menstrual inequity.113
Legal commentators also generally endorse the route of repeal. As
previously noted, Crawford and Spivack have pointed out that the
straightforward solution is repeal. 114 Similarly, in her Note on the
unconstitutionality of the tampon tax, Victoria Hartman calls for “future
courts and legislators” to “eliminate the tampon tax.” 115 But any legal
solution through the courts will only reduce the menstrual burden on women
by cents on the dollar. 116
Decades later, the issue is being litigated in court again. Class actions
seeking to end the tampon tax have been filed in at least four states:

110 The connection between the female sex and weakness has a long history. From ancient to
Victorian times, women with faintness, fluid retention, irritability, and a tendency to cause trouble were
considered to be hysterical. RACHEL P. MAINES, THE TECHNOLOGY OF ORGASM: “HYSTERIA,” THE
VIBRATOR, AND WOMEN’S SEXUAL SATISFACTION 22–42 (1999) (chronicling hysteria from the fifth
century B.C. to the nineteenth century). “Hysteria” stems from a Greek word that means “that which
proceeds from the uterus.” Id. at 21. For an excellent discussion of female hysteria, see id. at 21–47.
111 Geary, 544 N.E.2d at 355.
112 Crawford & Spivack, Tampon Taxes, Discrimination, and Human Rights, supra note 5, at 534.
After Geary, the state reclassified menstrual hygiene products such that they became taxed again. Id.
113 See infra Section III.D.
114 Crawford & Spivack, Tampon Taxes, Discrimination, and Human Rights, supra note 5, at 546.
115 Hartman, supra note 5, at 353.
116 A box of basic tampons costs $5.47. See infra note 202. At a sales tax rate of 7.25%, which is the
high end of the range of sales tax rates, see supra note 41 and accompanying text, the savings would only
be 28¢ per box.
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California, 117 Florida, 118 New York, 119 and Ohio. 120 These lawsuits allege
violations of state and federal constitutional protections. Specifically,
plaintiffs allege that the tampon tax violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause 121 and Due Process Clause 122 because it
discriminates against women by imposing a financial loss on them but not
on men. 123 Alternatively, each complaint also claims that, properly read,
existing exemptions for medical devices or supplies should include feminine
hygiene products because these products are medically necessary. 124 The
same rhetoric of necessity and issue of framing arise in these lawsuits as they
do in Geary.
This Note is focused on prescribing tax policy, and as such will not
focus on the strength or validity of the constitutional arguments brought forth
by these class actions. 125 Judicial action—although a solid backstop in the
event other reforms fail 126—is unlikely to be the path toward speedier or
more substantial change. For example, the New York class action’s

117 Class Action Complaint, DiSimone v. State, 2016 WL 3199722 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 3, 2016)
(No. 16CV293099).
118 Complaint, Wendell v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 2016-CA-1526 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 6, 2016);
see Jeff Burlew, Class-action Suit Seeks End of Florida’s ‘Tampon Tax,’ USA TODAY (July 13, 2016,
4:44 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2016/07/13/class-action-suit-seeks-endfloridas-tampon-tax/87047684 [https://perma.cc/QJ7L-5XGD]. Florida has since repealed the tampon
tax, but the status of the lawsuit is unclear.
119 Summons, Seibert v. N.Y. Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 2016 WL 822532 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 3,
2016) (No. 151800/2016). This lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed after New York repealed the tampon
tax. Bridget Crawford, Interview with Laura Strausfeld, New York Attorney Challenging the “Tampon
L.
PROFESSORS
(Nov.
15,
2016),
Tax,”
FEMINIST
http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2016/11/interview-laura-strausfeld-new-york-attorneychallenging-tampon-tax [https://perma.cc/67ZG-KFXN].
120 Complaint, Rowitz v. State, 2016 WL 1427325 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 11, 2016) (No.
16CV003518).
121 The Fourteenth Amendment states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
122 Id.
123 See, e.g., Complaint at 3, DiSimone v. State, 2016 WL 3199722 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2016) (No.
16CV293099).
124 See, e.g., id.
125 For an analysis of the constitutionality of the tampon tax, see Hartman, supra note 5; see also
Victoria Dickson, No More Bloody Taxes: Growing Opposition to the “Tampon Tax,” KY. L.J. BLOG
(Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.kentuckylawjournal.org/index.php/2016/04/06/no-more-bloody-taxesgrowing-opposition-to-the-tampon-tax [https://perma.cc/SB9A-359C].
126 Victoria Hartman provides a well-reasoned and convincing path forward for arguing against the
constitutionality of the tampon tax. In her Note, she argues that tampon taxes fail the exacting scrutiny
analysis and thus violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Hartman, supra note 5, at 338–52.
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injunctive claim was rendered moot after the state repealed the tampon tax. 127
Were there a successful outcome, that outcome would have been limited to
abolishing the tax on tampons. If true menstrual equity is the goal, legislative
action appears to be the more impactful way. But first it must be established
that the tampon tax cannot be justified.
II. THE UNEASY CASE AGAINST THE TAMPON TAX
Despite the fact that the tampon tax is an unavoidable financial burden
for the women who use menstrual hygiene products, most states still impose
the tax. Section A of this Part examines the sociopolitical reasons why the
tampon tax exists and continues to exist. Section B then moves on to a
discussion of the arguments against repealing the tampon tax, making a key
claim that repealing the tax is undesirable from a tax policy standpoint.
Section C goes on to make the uneasy case against the tampon tax based on
two rationales. First, exempting menstrual hygiene products from the sales
tax provides a better measure of well-being. Because these products are
necessities and not luxuries, their consumption does not make women better
off than they were before, and thus there is no increase in well-being to be
taxed. Second, the tampon tax is a discriminatory tax that uniquely burdens
women and thus redistributes wealth from women to men.
A. Why the Tampon Tax Exists
Critics of the tampon tax movement bristle at the suggestion that the
decision to tax menstrual hygiene products, but not other less necessary
products such as candy, is “a patriarchal privileging of candy over feminine
hygiene.” 128 Even opponents of the tax appear to suggest that the decision is
not the symptom of overt, malicious sexism, but rather a product of maledominated legislatures. Former President Barack Obama, when asked about
the tampon tax by YouTube personality Ingrid Nilsen, responded, “I have to
tell you, I have no idea why states would tax these as luxury items. I suspect
it’s because men were making the laws when those taxes were passed.” 129
Similarly, the founder of the United States-based campaign to end the
tampon tax, Jennifer Weiss-Wolf, said: “I don’t imagine there has ever been
a secret or nefarious plot to purposefully exclude menstruation from

127 Bridget Crawford, Interview with Zoe Salzman, New York Attorney Challenging the “Tampon
Tax,” FEMINIST L. PROFESSORS (July 28, 2016), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2016/07/
interview-zoe-salzman-new-york-attorney-challenging-tampon-tax [https://perma.cc/NC65-YVGA].
128 Allen, supra note 27.
129 Maya Rhodan, President Obama Doesn’t Understand the “Tampon Tax” Either, TIME (Jan. 15,
2016), http://time.com/4183108/obama-tampon-tax-sanitary [http://perma.cc/K25R-B3GB].
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policymaking. Rather, it is simply the outcome of too few women at the
decision-making table . . . .” 130
This argument seems overly simplistic. While part of the problem might
simply be that women were not at the proverbial table, there are deeper and
possibly more nefarious reasons that menstrual hygiene products remain
taxed in forty-two states. For example, California Governor Jerry Brown’s
veto of the tampon tax repeal 131 cannot be explained by nonsalience—that
the issue simply had not been thought about before in male-dominated
legislatures. Likewise, nonsalience does not explain why an all-male
Revenue and Taxation Committee in the Utah legislature defeated a bill that
would have exempted feminine hygiene products from the Utah sales tax.132
Even when confronted with the issue, lawmakers choose to do nothing.
Perhaps it is the “siren call of nothingness,” as feminist tax scholar Edward
McCaffery describes it, that compels lawmakers to adhere to the status
quo. 133
Another possibility for the prevalence of the tampon tax is a deep
discomfort with menstruation. Professor McCaffery has shown how, beyond
the deeply gendered biases of tax code, treatment of women in real-world
markets create a continuous feedback loop that encourages women to stay
home in the domestic sphere. 134 The same observation might be made with
the tampon tax. Beyond the pecuniary impact of the tax itself, societal
perceptions of menstruation also impose additional burdens on women. An
analysis of public discourse on the tampon tax by Lea Hunter illustrates the
130 Bridget Crawford, Interview with Jennifer Weiss-Wolf, New York Attorney and Menstrual Equity
Advocate, FEMINIST L. PROFESSORS (Nov. 22, 2016), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/
2016/11/interview-jennifer-weiss-wolf-new-york-attorney-menstrual-equity-advocate
[https://perma.cc/E4CV-EHXF].
131 Derek Hawkins, With Governor’s Veto, California’s ‘Tampon Tax’ Will Survive, for Now, WASH.
POST (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/09/14/withgovernors-veto-californias-tampon-tax-will-survive-for-now [https://perma.cc/WV9K-6ELW].
132 Lee Davidson, So-called ‘Tampon Tax’ Exemption Defeated, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Feb. 11, 2016,
9:40
AM),
http://www.sltrib.com/home/3524704-155/so-called-tampon-tax-exemption-defeated
[https://perma.cc/8BY8-XRG4]; Revenue and Taxation Committee, Utah House of Representatives,
https://ballotpedia.org/Revenue_and_Taxation_Committee,_Utah_House_of_
BALLOTPEDIA,
Representatives [https://perma.cc/8YV3-L7RW]. After the 2016 effort failed, the sponsor of the bill
reintroduced it as House Bill 71, but that bill also died in committee. Hygiene Tax Act, H.B. 71, 62d Leg.,
Gen. Sess. (Utah 2017); Hope Woodside, Bill to Exempt Hygiene Items Like Tampons from Sales Tax in
Utah Stalls in Committee, FOX 13 SALT LAKE CITY (Feb. 11, 2017, 9:50 PM),
http://fox13now.com/2017/02/11/bill-to-exempt-hygiene-items-like-tampons-from-sales-tax-in-utahstalls-in-committee [https://perma.cc/WZ9R-4RYB].
133 EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 269 (paperback ed., 1999) (“Nothing is always the
easiest thing to do. Conservatives always have this advantage, this final trump.”).
134 Broadly speaking, “[w]orking mothers bear the stigma at work of being working mothers.” Id. at
231. McCaffery points out, for example, that coworkers resent working mothers, and expect their time
and loyalties to be divided. Id. at 229–49.
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role of menstrual taboo, which refers to the constantly perpetuated myth that
menstruation is unclean and unsafe:
Physically, menstrual blood is viewed as an abomination; it is unclean,
disgusting, and more aversive than other bodily fluids. Visible marks of
menstruation, such as leakage of menstrual blood, are a characterological flaw
that discredits femininity and signals poor judgment. . . . [I]t is limited to
women and girls who are thus marked “as different from the normative and
privileged male body.” 135

Unsurprisingly, then, Hunter finds that the movement to repeal is most
successful when activists directly break the taboo, such as by referencing
menstrual blood or bloody tampons. 136 This tactic “instantly genders the
discussion” and “provides attention for the gendered nature of the
experience.” 137 Indeed, Hunter notes that politicians who opposed repeal
ignored the discriminatory aspect of the tax and appealed to fiscal
concerns. 138 Similarly, Professors Crawford and Spivack trace the cultural
roots of menstruation to argue that the tampon tax is unnoticed due to a
“hysteria” that “magnif[ies] the natural event of menstruation to unreal and
overwhelming proportions.” 139 They note that female bleeding is construed
differently from male bleeding: whereas the latter signifies choice and
control, the former is “not only involuntary but also punitive and indicative
of weakness.” 140
Together, these insights suggest that the reason for the persistence of
the tampon tax may extend far beyond the simplistic explanation that women
were not making the laws when the tampon tax was first put into place. The
taboo surrounding menstruation explains not only why the tax has gone
unnoticed but also why, after it is noticed, it remains. The idea that
135 Lea Hunter, The “Tampon Tax”: Public Discourse of Policies Concerning Menstrual Taboo,
17 HINCKLEY J. POL. 11, 12 (2016) (citation omitted).
136 Id. at 17.
137 Id.
138 Id. Hunter offers two such examples. John Howard, an Australian politician, rejected an
exemption for tampon taxes “on the grounds that it would lead to too many other exemptions.” Id. at 15.
Similarly, David Cameron, the former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, obliquely pointed to the
difficulty of changing the European VAT system. Id. Similarly, in vetoing the California bill that would
have repealed the tampon tax, Governor Jerry Brown stated that the bill “creates a new tax break,” which
he considered “important when the state’s budget remains precariously balanced.” Letter from the Office
of Gov. Edmund G. Brown Jr. to the Members of the Cal. State Assembly (Sep. 13, 2016),
https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/AB_1561_Veto_Message.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W8SC-9U5E]; see also State Assemb. 1561, 2015–2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2016) (text of vetoed bill).
139 Crawford & Spivack, Tampon Taxes, Discrimination, and Human Rights, supra note 5, at 506–
07.
140 Id. at 511.
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menstruation symbolizes weakness and dirtiness is a symptom of sexism and
gender discrimination that has seeped into the tax code–––the tampon tax
being a manifestation of that gender bias. In the California and Utah
examples, 141 it is difficult to attribute the refusal to repeal to anything other
than a direct—as opposed to unnoticed—target of menstruation. Contrary to
what some might claim, the tampon tax “outrage” is not “overblown.” 142
Rather, that the tampon tax exists and continues to exist illustrates the
failings of the legislative process. The natural impulse against such failures,
then, might be to repeal the ill-advised legislation. The next Section shows
why the answer may not be that easy.
B. Exemptions and the Sales Tax
The tampon tax is a sales tax. Menstrual hygiene products are simply
included in the tax base. As a matter of tax design, exemptions from the tax
base are inefficient, and a clean tax base is desirable. 143 Preferences for
certain types of consumption, such as housing and healthcare, create
“messiness” in the tax base. 144 Repealing the tampon tax by granting an
exemption from the sales tax, which is the dominant approach, is one such
type of preference.
Generally, this messiness is undesirable for a number of reasons. First,
each preference that benefits one person penalizes someone else, because tax
rates have to be raised to make up for the lost revenue. 145 As Professors
Slemrod and Bakija remind us, “Remember, we are taxing ourselves.” 146 One
empirical model found an increase of 0.10 to 0.25 percentage points in the
tax rate for each exemption. 147 Second, preferences “create an incentive to
engage ‘too much’ in the lightly taxed activity and too little in other
activities.” 148 This objection is not relevant here because, for the most part,
women cannot decide to menstruate more often than they already do. Third,
exemption preferences complicate the tax code. 149 An exemption from the

141 See supra notes 131–32 and accompanying text (discussing failed efforts to repeal the tax in
California and Utah).
142 Allen, supra note 27.
143 See supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text.
144 SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 3, at 217 (noting that mortgage and healthcare deductions create
messiness in the income tax base).
145 Id. (“Every preference is a penalty for someone else because it requires tax rates to be higher than
otherwise.”).
146 Id. at 88.
147 See Thomas Stratmann, The Political Economy of Sales Taxes and Sales Tax Exemptions,
171 PUB. CHOICE 207, 207 (2017).
148 SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 3, at 218.
149 Id.
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consumption tax base is a tax expenditure, and scholars have pointed out that
tax expenditure provisions add complexity to the tax code by lengthening tax
returns and imposing additional audit costs. 150 Repeal of the tampon tax may
not lengthen returns for individual taxpayers but may cause manufacturers
to seek to classify their goods as menstrual hygiene products. Moreover,
transition to non-taxation of menstrual hygiene products will impose a onetime compliance cost on retailers. Thus, it is a central insight of optimal tax
theory that taxes should be uniform across all final goods. 151 If the goal is to
reduce the tax burden on low-income individuals, optimal tax economists
counsel that redistributive income taxation may be a better way than granting
exemptions. 152
Finally, apart from tax design issues, one compelling argument against
exemptions from the sales tax base is the “political slippery slope.” 153 As one
policy analyst eloquently explains: “Loopholes accorded to one group breed
additional loopholes, by fueling demand from other groups for equally
favored treatment and by weakening congressional resolve to stem the tide
of special requests.” 154
From a tax policy standpoint, preserving the tampon tax is efficient
because it maintains a clean tax base. Despite these compelling arguments
against repeal, the next Section argues for repeal both because menstrual
hygiene products are necessities that do not increase well-being, and because
the tax discriminatorily redistributes wealth from women to men.
C. Why Repeal?
Because messy tax bases are undesirable, any preference, such as an
exemption for menstrual hygiene products, must have strong reasons
supporting it. 155 Taking up this challenge, this Section proposes that, despite
the aforementioned inefficiencies, the tampon tax cannot be justified, and
thus needs to be repealed. In addition, this Section begins to sketch out the
theoretical foundation for a women’s health credit, a proposal that will be
more extensively examined in Part III.
150

See, e.g., STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 105–06 (1985).
N. Gregory Mankiw, Matthew Weinzierl & Danny Yagan, Optimal Taxation in Theory and
Practice, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 147, 164–65 (2009).
152 Id. at 166.
153 William G. Gale, Don’t Buy the Sales Tax, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 1, 1998), https://www.
brookings.edu/research/dont-buy-the-sales-tax [https://perma.cc/854M-KUZL].
154 Id.
155 MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 43, at 125 (“As already noted, economists tell us that ‘cleaner’
tax bases are less distortionary and thus cost us all less. This puts the burden of proof on those who favor
any particular exclusion or deduction from the tax base.”); SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 3, at 218
(“[T]he burden of proof should rest on those who defend deviations from a clean tax base.”).
151

132

113:109 (2018)

Bleeding Women Dry

When considering an exemption, independent of judgments about
fairness or broader philosophies of redistributive justice, the wisdom of
differential treatment of individuals with different characteristics—in this
case, sex—must be evaluated. 156 Because the tax uniquely burdens women,
it redistributes wealth from women to men. The issue is not even one of
fairness; rather, it is one of redistribution. Should we redistribute dollars
from women to men through the tax system? After all, the tax code makes
distinctions all the time, such as between married and unmarried persons.
Does the distinction between males and females matter?
Professors Murphy and Nagel posit that fairness is “about after-tax
results, not about their relation to the pre-tax situation.” 157 That is because
pre-tax outcomes are “both entirely imaginary and morally irrelevant;” 158
people start from different points in life and may have innate characteristics,
entirely apart from effort or hard work, that result in advantageous pre-tax
outcomes. 159 Consider then two taxpayers, Amy and Ben, who make identical
amounts of money and are equally well off in the no-tax world. The principle
of horizontal equity, which states that individuals at the same level of income
should pay the same amount of tax, would dictate that the same rate be
applied to Amy and Ben. If there were a tax on tampons, Amy would pay
more in taxes than Ben, because she has no choice but to buy tampons.
Taxing goods that do not represent “the same share of total income for most
people” violates horizontal equity. 160 A tax on tampons imposes a higher
burden on Amy just because she uses tampons. But if we accept the
proposition that pre-tax outcomes have no independent moral significance,
then the horizontal equity argument is irrelevant.
Another argument might be that various exemptions already exist
within the sales tax system. What’s one more? If states already exempt

156 MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 43, at 162–63 (“The problem is that if the tax system, for whatever
broad reasons, treats differently situated people differently, it becomes necessary to decide which are the
differences that should matter.”).
157 Id. at 164.
158 Id. at 99.
159 See generally id. at 31–37.
160 SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 3, at 89.
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Viagra, 161 Rogaine, 162 and candy, 163 it only seems right that tampons be
exempted, too. After all, the common concern that exemptions penalize
someone else seems insignificant given the low amount of lost revenue from
repealing the tampon tax. But this line of reasoning is dangerous, even when
the exemption is for something as necessary as tampons. This is because the
political system, as Professors Slemrod and Bakija argue, “is incapable of
distinguishing legitimate arguments from illegitimate ones and often
succumbs to the political clout of powerful pleaders.” 164 The slope is all too
slippery.
The case for repealing the tampon tax must turn on other grounds. The
key is the rhetoric of necessity that has permeated the movement to repeal,
the legislative responses, and the legal responses to the tax. 165 If women must
buy menstrual hygiene products to maintain a productive life, an exemption
for such products would make the tax base “a more accurate measurement
of well-being.” 166 This is a point often raised in the context of healthcare. For
example, the legislature might choose to exempt certain necessities like
prescription medication on the basis that medications only return the sick to
health rather than increasing their well-being. Similarly, spending money on
menstrual hygiene services merely returns women to their usual level of
well-being, whereas spending money on a fancy car or expensive vacation
161

Viagra is classified as a prescription medication, which is typically exempt from sales taxes. See,
e.g., WIS. STAT. § 77.54(14) (2017) (exemption from sales and use tax for prescription drugs); see also
Jordan Gass-Poore’, Citing Gender Bias, State Lawmakers Move to Eliminate ‘Tampon Tax,’ NPR (Mar.
6, 2016, 1:00PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/03/06/467377295/citing-gender-bias-state-lawmakersmove-to-eliminate-tampon-tax [https://perma.cc/JHC9-8JY4] (“Sales tax isn’t applied to Viagra in
Wisconsin, but it is applied to tampons and pads.”).
162 See, e.g., NEW YORK ST. DEP’T OF TAX’N & FIN., TB-ST-193, SALES AND USE TAX (2014),
https://www.tax.ny.gov/pubs_and_bulls/tg_bulletins/st/drugstores.htm [https://perma.cc/AN6N-M9L8]
(explaining that both prescription and nonprescription drugs, such as dandruff shampoo, are sales-tax
exempt); see also Annamarya Scaccia, In New York, Tampons Are Still Taxed—But Rogaine Isn’t,
BROADLY (Mar. 7, 2016, 12:10 PM), https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/tampon-tax-lawsuit-newyork [https://perma.cc/HGX9-GB8C] (“Yet the agency classifies Rogaine, dandruff shampoo, adult
diapers, and incontinence pads—items also used by men—as ‘medical supplies,’ and thus tax exempt.”).
163 See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 6359(a)–(b)(1) (West 2018) (exempting food products,
which include candy, from the sales tax). See generally Jennifer Dunn, Sales Tax by State: Is Candy
Taxable?, TAXJAR (Feb. 13, 2017), http://blog.taxjar.com/sales-tax-state-candy-taxable [https://perma.
cc/364J-Z6QA] (surveying sales tax on candy in each state).
164 SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 3, at 218.
165 See supra notes 10 (tampon tax movement); 64–65 (legislative response); 105–08 (legal response)
and accompanying text.
166 SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 3, at 218. Well-being is an important concept in tax policy
debates about whether individuals with the same level of well-being should be taxed at the same level
(horizontal equity) and whether individuals with different levels of well-being should be taxed at different
levels (vertical equity). Id. at 59–60. As discussed in Section I.A, sales taxes are regressive and thus
violate vertical equity. Repealing the tampon tax improves horizontal equity by accounting for the fact
that menstrual hygiene products do not increase, but simply restore, women’s well-being.
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makes that person better off than someone else without such consumption.
The latter is a personal choice between various channels of gratification; the
former is a necessity that does not increase women’s welfare. Defenders of
the tampon tax thus miss the point that our hypothetical taxpayers, Amy and
Ben, do not have the same opportunities to consume and to save.
Accordingly, imposing a tax on tampons will not serve redistributive goals.
If the theory of the consumption tax is fairness to savers, there is no justice
for women who cannot substitute consumption for savings.
The idea that tampons are a necessity is not to be confused with the
separate idea that the tax is uniquely a tax on women; either is a sufficient
justification for a tampon exemption. The tampon tax’s sole applicability to
women is a rationale necessary to overcome one failing of the necessity
justification. Even though items like prescription medication and menstrual
hygiene products are necessities, the legislature may nevertheless choose to
include them in the tax base due to efficiency concerns and to mitigate the
impact of this inclusion through cash transfers or direct assistance programs.
A tax that uniquely burdens a protected group 167 raises different
concerns than necessity. It is true that the tax system discriminates against
certain groups all the time, such as against non-homeowners by providing
mortgage interest deductions to homeowners. Discrimination on the basis of
sex, however, is an entirely different matter because sex is immutable. 168
Justice Antonin Scalia once proclaimed, “A tax on wearing yarmulkes is a
tax on Jews.” 169 Similarly, a tax on tampons is a tax on women. Menstruation
is a source of inequality between men and women. It is estimated that a
woman spends over $18,000 on menstruation-related products 170 during her
167

Sex-based classifications are “subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.” Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971)). The Supreme Court
has shied away from subjecting sex-based classifications to strict scrutiny; rather, the Court held that
“classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related
to achievement of those objectives.” Id. Scholars have characterized this test as intermediate scrutiny.
E.g., Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal Protection Doctrine?,
43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 1079 (2011). For an extended analysis of the constitutionality of the tampon tax,
see Hartman, supra note 5, at 347–53.
168 In Frontiero v. Richardson, the Supreme Court stated that “sex, like race and national origin, is
an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth.” 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). This
Court would have subjected sex-based classifications to strict scrutiny, id. at 688, but the decision was
not controlling, see Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 167, at 1079 (“But within a few years, it was
apparent to the Justices that there was not a fifth vote for strict scrutiny.”).
169 Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993).
170 Jessica Kane, Here’s How Much A Woman’s Period Will Cost Her Over A Lifetime, HUFFINGTON
POST
(published
May
18,
2015,
12:05
PM;
updated
Dec.
6,
2017),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/18/period-cost-lifetime_n_7258780.html
[https://perma.cc/8XFG-MMVK]. This estimate includes items meant to reduce symptoms associated
with menstruation, such as painkillers for cramps. See id.
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lifetime, and $1700 on tampons alone. 171 This is money that only women
must spend. As a society that has enshrined equal protection and due process
in the Constitution, 172 hopefully we can all agree that the government should
not treat women differently from men. Sex, like religion, is inherently
suspect as a category of unequal treatment.173 Whereas it might be acceptable
to treat Amy and Ben differently because Amy prefers to sail expensive
yachts while Ben prefers to watch free television at home, a tax on tampons
is entirely a tax on menstruation, as a proxy for sex, much like a tax on
yarmulkes, as a proxy for religion, is entirely a tax on Jews. A gender-neutral
sales tax system does not mean gender-neutral treatment. 174
Because the tax is uniquely a tax on women, it has the effect of
redistributing wealth from women to men. Women shoulder the burden of
paying the tax, and those dollars are then redistributed throughout society in
the form of public goods. 175 It is precisely because of this disproportionate
burden that it might make sense to tax items like toilet paper but not tampons.
Samantha Allen of The Daily Beast points out that sales tax exemptions are
nuanced and that only two states specifically exempt toilet paper. 176 But
everyone—male or female—uses toilet paper. In contrast, only women use
tampons; there is no redistribution from women to men caused by a toilet
paper tax, unless women for some reason use drastically more toilet paper
than men. Seductive as it may be, Allen’s argument thus holds no water.
Indeed, the fact that the tampon tax remains—especially after attention
has been drawn to the tax—signals to women that their periods are “luxuries”
that should be taxed, that their sex is an undesirable one. This, in turn, will
likely have a negative effect on tax morale. Tax morale, broadly speaking, is
a term for “nonpecuniary factors” for tax compliance. 177 For example, people
might be intrinsically motivated to pay taxes due to feelings of pride or
altruism toward others. 178 Or they might view taxes as one term of a contract

171

Id.
See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.
173 This is not to say that sex-based classifications and religion-based classifications are subject to
the same level of scrutiny. See supra notes 167–68; see also Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc.
v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021 (2017) (noting that policy that affects free exercise of religion “triggers
the most exacting scrutiny”). Sex and religion are, nevertheless, suspect classes.
174 Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2031 (1996) (“[G]ender-neutral language does not guarantee gender-neutral
treatment . . . .”).
175 Unless tax dollars are redistributed solely to women, the fact that women pay the tampon tax and
men do not means that some benefit is necessarily shifted to men.
176 Allen, supra note 27.
177 Erzo F. P. Luttmer & Monica Singhal, Tax Morale, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 149, 149–51 (2014).
178 Id. at 155.
172
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between the governing and governed and thus be more inclined to pay if they
perceive the government as legitimate and the tax system as fair. 179
Similarly, a sales tax system that treats women unfairly and
disproportionately might lower tax morale. The tampon tax has remained
nonsalient for a long time, as illustrated by the gap between the Geary
decision in 1980 180 and recent renewed attention to it. It is difficult to view a
tax of which one is unaware as unfair. But now that the tax is becoming more
and more salient, women might conclude that the tax system—and
government overall—does not serve their interests and refuse to pay taxes.
This is a phenomenon that has been traced as far back as the 1870s, during
which women suffragists refused to pay tax because they could not vote—a
contemporary form of “no taxation without representation.” 181 It is important
to distinguish lower tax morale caused by the unfairness of the tax itself from
that caused by the recent publicity of the tampon tax. That is, publicity
merely brings attention to the tax; the inherently discriminatory feature of
the tax is what affects tax morale. It remains to be seen the extent to which
the tampon tax will affect tax morale, but tax morale should be an important
factor in evaluating the call for repeal.
III. A BETTER SOLUTION: THE WOMEN’S HEALTH CREDIT
The previous Part examined arguments for and against the tampon tax
and concluded that it should be repealed. Specifically, the tax discriminates
against women by placing a disproportionate burden on them—one that they
cannot choose to avoid. This Part now shifts gear to take up Anne Alstott’s
challenge of translating competing feminist goals—equal treatment,
encouraging women’s market work, and assistance to caregivers who are
typically women 182—“into concrete policy prescriptions.” 183
First, the concept of equal treatment means “the application of the same
legal rules to men and women.” 184 In the context of the tampon tax, this
would mean repeal. Although theoretically men and women have to pay the
tax on tampons, only women must buy tampons, so the legal rules are
unequally applied in practice.
179

Id. at 157. To illustrate, consider this example: when Britain moved to a poll tax from a property
tax, tax evasion increased, probably because the poll tax was considered unfair and unrelated to ability to
pay, insofar as it imposed a fixed amount on every taxpayer. Id. at 158.
180 See supra Section I.C for background information on Geary.
181 Carolyn C. Jones, Dollars and Selves: Women’s Tax Criticism and Resistance in the 1870s, in
CRITICAL TAX THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 13, 14–17 (Anthony C. Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford eds.,
2009).
182 Alstott, supra note 174, at 2003.
183 Id. at 2004.
184 Id. at 2003.
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The second goal of encouraging women’s market work overlaps with
the first goal, in that “eliminating legal biases against women’s market work
could lead them to work more.” 185 As is often noted, the lack of access to
menstrual hygiene products results in women missing work and school out
of self-consciousness about the sight and smell of blood or worries about
bullying. 186 Women also reuse sanitary products or extend the length of use,
which may lead to an increased risk of infections that will also keep women
from working or attending school. 187 Although repeal would eliminate the
legal bias against women, it only partially reduces the financial burden of
menstruation. Even without the tampon tax, women may nevertheless be
unable to afford menstrual hygiene products that will enable them to
participate in the market.
That leads us to Alstott’s third goal, assistance to caregivers, which
means providing cash grants or other forms of direct assistance to women to
“improve their economic security and social status.” 188 Some reforms may
be more effective than others in achieving underlying feminist goals. 189 For
example, Alstott argues that the equal treatment justification for individual
filing—as opposed to joint filing—is symbolic and will not eliminate the bias
against women as second earners in a household. 190 Rather, an expanded
dependent care tax credit and family allowances are better compromises
between the three competing goals. 191 In the menstrual equity context, repeal
coupled with a women’s health credit will eliminate the legal bias against
women, increase women’s participation in the workforce and schools, and
assist them with the financial costs of menstruation.
With this as background, the rest of this Part will evaluate each proposal
for reform: (A) repeal, (B) free tampons, (C) coverage of feminine hygiene

185

Id. at 2007.
See, e.g., Inga T. Winkler & Virginia Roaf, Taking the Bloody Linen out of the Closet: Menstrual
Hygiene as a Priority for Achieving Gender Equality, 21 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 1, 8 (2014) (noting
that girls in developing countries often miss school during menstruation and sometimes drop out after the
onset of menstruation). Solving this problem is one of the justifications cited for legislation in New York
City that would provide free menstrual hygiene products in schools, prisons, and homeless shelters. See
infra Section I.B. Mayor Bill de Blasio stated, “Students should be able to concentrate on their studies . . .
without the indignity of inadequate access to tampons and pads.” de Blasio Press Release, supra note 82.
First Lady of New York City Chirlane McCray also stated, “No young person should miss class or be
embarrassed at school because she needs a tampon or pad.” Id.
187 Cf. Winkler & Roaf, supra note 186, at 8 (“One study found a higher incidence of reproductive
tract infections in cases of inadequate menstrual hygiene management, in particular for socioeconomically deprived women.”).
188 Alstott, supra note 174, at 2003.
189 Id. at 2005.
190 Id. at 2016–17.
191 Id. at 2081.
186
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products in welfare programs and the ACA, and (D) a tax credit. Because
Geary has illustrated the ineffectiveness of a court-based solution, 192 this Part
will focus only on legislative prescriptions. Ultimately, this Part concludes
that a tax credit combined with repeal is the best solution.
A. Repeal
As illustrated in Part I, the dominant form of reform has been repeal.
Indeed, repeal is what most activists seek. 193 Part II then evaluated arguments
for and against the tampon tax and concluded that it cannot be justified and
therefore must be repealed. Setting aside, however, the claim that the tampon
tax is a form of gender discrimination, the effects of repeal must also be
examined.
Repeal does not necessarily remove any financial burden at all because
of tax shifting. 194 That is, suppliers could raise the price of tampons by the
amount of the tax break, such that the consumer still pays the same amount
she would have paid before repeal. Thus, who ultimately enjoys the benefit
of repeal—tax incidence 195—is relevant; if consumers do not enjoy the tax
break and the goal is to benefit them, repeal would be pointless. However,
economic theory and empirical analysis likely discredit this argument. A
study analyzing data from New Jersey’s repeal of the tampon tax finds that
the benefit of the repeal goes to the consumer in the form of reduced prices.196
Interestingly, the study also suggests that low-income consumers benefit
more than high-income consumers do: whereas high-income consumers
share the benefit with suppliers, low-income consumers enjoy a price decline
larger than the size of the tampon tax. 197 The authors, however, caution that
the difference in benefits across income levels may be overstated because it
does not account for opportunity costs incurred to obtain the purchase price,
such as searching for coupons. 198 Nevertheless, this difference is a possible
192

See supra Section I.C.
See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text (campaigns to end the tampon tax); see also supra
Section I.B (concluding that repeal is the dominant legislative response).
194 Tax shifting is “[t]he phenomenon that taxes that are ostensibly levied on one group of people
may end up being borne by others.” SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 3, at 76.
195 See id. (“[W]ho ultimately ends up bearing the burden is called by economists tax incidence.”).
196 Christopher Cotropia & Kyle Rozema, Who Benefits from Repealing Tampon Taxes? Empirical
Evidence from New Jersey, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 620, 629, 633 (2018). Prices declined by 7.3%
after repeal, which was more than the then-applicable tax of 6.9%. Id. at 633.
197 Id. at 622. Specifically, prices declined by 3.9% for high-income consumers and by 12.4% for
low-income consumers. Id. These statistics support the hypothesis that only suppliers with monopoly or
market power can successfully raise prices. At the low-end, generic segment of the market, the products
are likely somewhat homogenous, so producers would lose sales by raising prices, whereas brand
differentiation at the higher end may allow producers to absorb some of the increased surplus, but not all.
198 Id. at 623.
193
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distributional consequence of repeal that could justify repeal, especially
when the goal is to help low-income women afford menstrual hygiene
products.
Assuming one cares about redistributive justice, another especially
compelling argument against repeal is that it would have regressive
consequences. At the very least, all women across the economic spectrum
will benefit by the same amount from a repeal. This is not at all regressive,
but repeal is not necessarily progressive either, 199 as eliminating a regressive
tax merely restores the pre-tax baseline. The situation, however, is
complicated by the rise of “premium” tampons, such as biodegradable, 100%
organic cotton tampons or tampons with resealable wrappers and better leak
protection. These “premium” tampons carry a “premium” price tag. The
brand Lola, which boasts of toxin-free, dye-free, and synthetic-free tampons,
charges $10 for a box of eighteen tampons. 200 Another brand, Cora, provides
BPA-free plastic applicators, organic cotton tampons, and attractive lipsticksized cardboard capsules for stashing the tampons at $16 for a box of twentyfour tampons. 201 In contrast, Tampax Cardboard tampons—presumably
named to differentiate them from their more expensive, premium sister, the
Tampax Radiant—cost $5.47 for a box of forty tampons. 202 The premium
tampons cater to high-income women who can afford them; it is unlikely that
female minimum-wage earners, for example, would want to pay more than
three times the price of an average box of tampons for something that serves
the same purpose. Furthermore, high-income women have fewer children
and consequently are more likely to be on their periods. 203 When these other
199 If further research shows that the tax break is unevenly distributed between low-income and highincome consumers, repeal could actually have some progressivity because low-income women would
receive a larger benefit. See supra notes 195–98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the tax
incidence of repeal. Even so, that must be balanced against the regressivity, discussed in this paragraph,
resulting from the use of high-end products.
200 LOLA, https://mylola.com [https://perma.cc/RDA5-YD2T].
201 CORA, https://cora.life [http://perma.cc/XP9F-CMHP].
202 Tampax Tampons with Cardboard Applicator, Super, 40 Count, WALMART, https://www.
walmart.com/ip/Tampax-Tampons-with-Cardboard-Applicator-Super-40-Count/876493
[https://perma.cc/RP2V-TCRB].
203 See Jason Weeden et al., Do High-Status People Really Have Fewer Children?, 17 HUM. NATURE
377, 377 (2006) (“Women in the general population with higher adult income have fewer children . . . .”).
Note that some contraceptive devices, such as intrauterine devices (IUDs) and extended-cycle birth
control pills, reduce the frequency of or prevent menstruation entirely. One study found no association
between the use of long-acting reversible contraception and income level. Megan L. Kavanaugh et al.,
Changes in Use of Long-Acting Reversible Contraceptive Methods Among U.S. Women, 2009–2012,
126 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 917, 919 (2015). There is data, however, that suggests low-income
women are more likely to express interest in delaying or suppressing their periods, Anna Greenberg &
Jennifer Berktold, Menstruation and Menstrual Suppression Survey, ASS’N OF REPROD. HEALTH PROF.’S
15
(Feb.
2006),
http://www.arhp.org/uploadDocs/2005menstruationsurvey_fullreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/65DK-RHWU], and also more likely to undergo sterilization, Maureen K. Baldwin et
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factors are considered, repealing the tampon tax becomes regressive: the
bulk of the benefit goes to high-income women who spend more on
menstrual hygiene products.
This argument, however, misses the larger picture. It is true that the
benefits of repeal mostly go to high-income women if we consider only
dollar amounts. However, the marginal utility of a dollar is higher for a lowincome woman than it is for a high earner. A woman with $100,000 in her
bank account is unlikely to notice the difference of another $1, while an extra
$1 could mean the ability to afford a pregnancy test for a woman with $20
in her account. 204 When marginal utility rather than dollar amounts is the
metric, low-income women may benefit more from a repeal.
Moreover, the case remains that the tampon tax is discriminatory. 205
Repealing the tampon tax serves an equal treatment goal. 206 If the tampon tax
unjustifiably places the tax burden solely on women and not men, then repeal
would remove that burden and the tax system would once again treat Amy
and Ben the same way. 207 Repeal also marginally encourages women’s
market work and slightly improves women’s economic security. Compared
to a tax credit, 208 which is provided only after one files for taxes yearly, repeal
has immediate consequences: women save their money whenever they buy
menstrual hygiene products now—even if it is dollars and cents—rather than
later. The tampon tax presents a greater burden to low-income women than
to high-income women because the marginal utility of the next dollar is
higher for low-income women. In tax policy terms, this is a timing issue.
Even though repeal is part of the solution, it is not the whole solution.
Repeal does not do much to provide assistance to women. At best, it slightly
mitigates women’s financial burden associated with menstruation; at worst,
it is only symbolic. Repealing the tampon tax translates to a tax break of
dollars and cents for each woman—a minimal amount compared to the
al., Lack of Insurance and Parity Influence Choice Between Long-Acting Reversible Contraception and
Sterilization in Women Postpregnancy, 86 CONTRACEPTION 42, 46 (2012). Observers have expressed
concern that interventions targeted at increasing the use of IUDs and implants among low-income women
would undermine reproductive autonomy. Anu Manchikanti Gomez et al., Women or LARC First?
Reproductive Autonomy and the Promotion of Long-Acting Reversible Contraceptive Methods, 46 PERSP.
SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 171, 171 (2014). That low-income women are more interested in menstrual
suppression drives home the point that the burdens of menstruation particularly affect them.
204 Pregnancy tests from the dollar store are supposed to be just as reliable as name-brand tests—and
yes, they cost only a dollar. Kristin Wong, 8 Things You Won’t Believe Cost $1, BANKRATE (June 25,
2015), http://www.bankrate.com/personal-finance/smart-money/1-buck-luck-8-things-you-can-buy-forjust-1/#slide=8 [https://perma.cc/3X9M-9CUN].
205 See supra notes 167–74 for a discussion of why the tax is discriminatory.
206 See Alstott, supra note 174, at 2003, for an explanation of the equal treatment goal.
207 See supra notes 157–60; 173–74 and accompanying text.
208 See infra Section III.D.
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estimated $18,171 women spend on menstruation-associated products over
a lifetime. 209 A more comprehensive solution that does more to mitigate
menstrual inequity is needed if the goals of equal treatment, encouraging
women’s market work, and assistance to caregivers—who are typically
women—are to be met.
B. Free Tampons
One way to reduce the impact of the tampon tax on low-income women
is to provide them with free tampons. New York City has led the way by
offering free menstrual hygiene products to women in homeless shelters and
public schools. 210 Similarly, Representative Meng’s federal proposal would
require large employers to provide menstrual hygiene products and condition
receipt of federal funds by prisons on adequate provision of such products to
inmates. 211 The idea is that homeless women, public school students, and
prison inmates are the most disadvantaged and most in need of governmental
assistance with the financial costs of menstruation.
This proposal is better than repeal in the sense that it recognizes that
low-income women may need financial assistance with their periods and are
unlikely to find the impact of a tax break significant. The reform, however,
is both overinclusive and underinclusive. Not all public school students are
from low-income families. And not all low-income women are either
homeless, students, or inmates. For example, women who make minimum
wage in the workforce will not benefit at all.
A potential solution to the underinclusiveness of New York City’s free
tampons program would be to expand the program to provide free tampons
for every woman—a free-tampons-for-all program. This solution would
ensure that women never have to spend money on feminine hygiene products
again, thus bridging the gender gap in a way that repeal alone cannot do.212
Yet a free-tampons-for-all program creates many costly administrative
complexities. 213 The agency administering the program would also have to
create a sourcing and distribution network. If the feminine hygiene products
are to be distributed at certain government locations, such as schools or
agency offices, beneficiaries must not only undergo the hassle of traveling

209

Kane, supra note 170.
See supra notes 75–82 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 83–94 and accompanying text.
212 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
213 An experiment involving Mexico’s food assistance program studied the difference between inkind and cash transfers. Jesse M. Cunha, Testing Paternalism: Cash Versus In-Kind Transfers, 6 AM.
ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 195, 196 (2014). While there were minimal differences in health outcomes, the
in-kind program cost at least 18% more than the cash transfer. Id. at 198.
210
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to those sites but also face the stigma of receiving benefits in a public place,
much like welfare recipients feel when they use their Electronic Benefit
Transfer (EBT) card at grocery stores. 214 Even if the products are to be
delivered directly to the recipient to avoid privacy and stigmatization issues,
such a task would be logistically challenging. 215 The government would have
to box and ship the products and maintain a database for addresses that could
be easily and quickly updated. Recipients may not even have permanent
addresses if they are homeless—or constantly getting evicted. Perhaps it is
because directly providing goods en masse is so logistically and
administratively challenging that a similar proposal to directly provide food
to low-income individuals has been summarily dismissed by members of
Congress. 216
Another issue with a free-tampons program, whether expanded to
include all women or not, is that it could restrict personal autonomy by
limiting recipients’ choices. 217 Some women could prefer tampons, while
others could prefer sanitary napkins, even as others prefer pantyliners.
Women could also prefer a certain brand that they are accustomed to using.
Still others could prefer premium organic tampons. 218 Limiting women’s
decision-making autonomy over such an intimate area of their lives is
214 The EBT card is a payment system that allows recipients to use welfare benefits at retailers. What
Is Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT)?, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV. (last published
July 18, 2018), https://www.fns.usda.gov/ebt/general-electronic-benefit-transfer-ebt-information
[https://perma.cc/3AVB-SM5W]; see also infra notes 229–32 and accompanying text for further
discussion of the stigma associated with welfare.
215 Similar criticisms have been made about the Trump Administration’s proposal to replace food
stamps with boxes containing government-purchased food items. Caitlin Dewey, Trump Wants to Slash
Food Stamps and Replace Them with a ‘Blue Apron-Type Program,’ WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/02/12/trump-wants-to-slash-food-stamps-andreplace-them-with-a-blue-apron-type-program [https://perma.cc/7BMF-ZKNR]. Advocates and analysts
expressed concerns with the shipping and logistical cost and administrative complications of delivering
boxes of food directly to SNAP recipients. Id. Others painted the proposal as a “logistical nightmare,”
and pointed out the stigma associated with going to a government agency to apply for and receive benefits.
Erica Hunzinger et al., Trump Administration Wants to Decide What Food SNAP Recipients Will Get,
NPR
(Feb.
12,
2018),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2018/02/12/585130274/trumpadministration-wants-to-decide-what-food-snap-recipients-will-get [https://perma.cc/FBE5-7K7W].
216 Glenn Thrush, Trump’s ‘Harvest Box’ Isn’t Viable in SNAP Overhaul, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb.
13,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/13/us/harvest-box-snap-food-stamps.html
[https://perma.cc/L7Q6-69QW] (describing the proposal as landing “with a thud” after the agriculture
committee chairmen in the House and Senate dismissed the idea).
217 Paternalism in welfare policy is a major concern. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Goldberg, No Such Thing
as a Free Lunch: Paternalism, Poverty, and Food Justice, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 35, 75–78 (2013)
(presenting a framework for evaluating paternalistic policies that affect marginalized groups). The issue
of whether such paternalism is permissible has generated lively debate. Id. at 66–75 (cataloging
arguments for and against paternalism). Permissible or not, policymakers should be cognizant of the issue
of paternalism because it is often raised by stakeholders and advocates.
218 See supra notes 200–02 and accompanying text for a discussion of premium tampons.
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paternalistic, however well-intentioned, and could even imply that the
government knows better than individual women which menstrual hygiene
products suit them best. 219 Of course, the program could provide a wide
variety of options, including premium products, to avoid the charge of
paternalism. But that approach would be costly, especially because women
will be likely to shift their preferences to premium tampons simply because
those are now free. Furthermore, the provision of premium tampons would
also entirely subsidize a personal consumption choice, which runs contrary
to the proposition that we should tax consumption choices but not
necessities. 220
And finally, providing free tampons does not do anything to mitigate
the financial burden caused by other products associated with and
necessitated by menstruation, such as pantyliners, medications for the relief
of menstrual cramps such as Midol, and new underwear. 221 These additional
financial burdens, as well as financial burdens faced by women left out of
the free provision of tampons, are best mitigated by a women’s tax credit.
C. Including Feminine Hygiene Products Within SNAP, WIC, and ACA
Durkin suggests expanding federal welfare programs to include
feminine hygiene products as benefits. 222 The Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) is a “national nutrition safety net” serving about
one-seventh of Americans as of 2011. 223 It is only available to low-income
individuals. 224 Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) complements SNAP by
providing nutritional assistance to low-income pregnant women, postpartum
219

Anti-hunger advocates have raised similar objections to a proposal to prevent SNAP recipients
from using their benefits to buy soda. Goldberg, supra note 217, at 60–61 (“These advocates are deeply
critical of paternalism that singles out the poor; they make the equality-based argument that SNAP
recipients should have the same freedom to buy the products of their choosing as other shoppers, and the
related argument that these proposals ‘imply[] that low-income people cannot be trusted to make their
own decisions.’” (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)).
220 See supra text accompanying note 166 (differentiating between consumption choices and
consumption borne out of necessity); infra text accompanying note 255 (same, but in the context of
premium tampons).
221 For an estimate of how much menstruation costs a woman over her lifetime, see Kane, supra
note 170.
222 Durkin, supra note 95, at 157–59.
223 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., BUILDING A HEALTHY AMERICA: A PROFILE
SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITIONAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 1 (2012), https://fnsOF
THE
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/BuildingHealthyAmerica.pdf [https://perma.cc/GNJ7-PU3A].
224 See id. at 2 (“Generally SNAP households must have monthly gross income less than 130 percent
of the Federal poverty guidelines ($2,422 for a family of four in fiscal year 2012), monthly net income
less than 100 percent of the poverty guidelines, and assets of less than $2,000. Households with elderly
(age 60 and older) and disabled members are exempt from the gross income limit and must have assets
less than $3,250.”).
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women, infants, and children. 225 Individuals eligible for SNAP are also
eligible for WIC. 226 As Durkin points out, feminine hygiene products are not
included in either SNAP or WIC, even though “both are designed to further
the health, safety, and welfare of low-income communities.” 227
It is indeed inconsistent that programs focused on improving health and
welfare among low-income individuals omit feminine hygiene products,
which are essential to the reproductive health of women and their ability to
work and attend school. What is attractive about this proposal is that it makes
use of an existing system—the universe of SNAP/WIC benefits is simply
expanded to include feminine hygiene products. Thus, it eliminates
compliance costs associated with building an entirely new distribution
network as required for a free-tampons-for-all program.
Any solution that relies on SNAP and WIC, however, necessarily
confines itself to solving the problem for only a small subset of women. If
the concern is solely with the susceptibility of low-income women to the
burdens of menstruation, then including feminine hygiene products within
SNAP and WIC benefits is a good solution. But if the fundamental problem
is the financial inequity caused by menstruation, then more must be done.
After all, many women who do not qualify for welfare benefits may still
struggle to afford feminine hygiene products, 228 and even those who can
afford feminine hygiene products find themselves at a financial disadvantage
to men.
Expanding SNAP/WIC benefits to include feminine hygiene products
not only excludes women who do not meet the programs’ eligibility criteria
225

About WIC—WIC at a Glance, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV. (Feb. 27, 2015),
http://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/about-wic-wic-glance [https://perma.cc/RVE5-29NW]. WIC and SNAP
recipients receive an electronic card similar to a credit card that allows them to buy authorized foods. See
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., THE SPECIAL SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION PROGRAM FOR WOMEN, INFANTS AND
CHILDREN (WIC PROGRAM) 1, https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/wic/wic-fact-sheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CFM7-WVH2]; Am I Eligible for SNAP?, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION
SERV.
(Apr.
8,
2018),
https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligibility#How%20do%20I%
20receive%20SNAP%20benefits? [https://perma.cc/7CSL-4L6N].
226 WIC Eligibility Requirements, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV. (May 4, 2017),
http://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/wic-eligibility-requirements [https://perma.cc/W7A2-N9ST].
227 Durkin, supra note 95, at 158.
228 Individuals and families above the poverty line still face economic insecurity. An analysis of
America’s lower middle class, defined as families with children earning between 100 to 250 percent of
the poverty line, shows that struggling lower-middle-class families still face food insecurity. MELISSA
KEARNEY ET. AL, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, A DOZEN FACTS ABOUT AMERICA’S STRUGGLING LOWERMIDDLE CLASS 10 (2013). For families living close to the poverty line, unanticipated setbacks could push
them into poverty. Id. at 5. Recall that SNAP phases out at gross income exceeding 130% of the poverty
line and at net income exceeding 100 percent of the poverty line. See supra note 224 and accompanying
text. In effect, many families who are economically insecure do not qualify for SNAP benefits. Until the
eligibility threshold for SNAP is radically expanded, co-opting the program to deliver menstrual hygiene
products would be an inadequate solution.

145

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

but may also exclude some low-income women as well. The stigma
associated with welfare benefits has been extensively documented.229
Recipients could perceive welfare as demeaning230 and feel self-loathing and
shame when they receive welfare benefits. 231 As a result, even low-income
women who qualify for SNAP/WIC may not apply for the benefits 232 and,
consequently, will not benefit from the ability to buy feminine hygiene
products with SNAP/WIC benefits.
Another significant proposal that Durkin advances is to include
feminine hygiene products within the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA)
contraception mandate. 233 Durkin argues that oral contraceptives are often
used for other medical conditions rather than for the sole purpose of
preventing pregnancy. 234 Feminine hygiene products, like oral
contraceptives, promote women’s reproductive and overall health, and thus
should be covered by the contraception mandate. 235 This proposal, along with
the proposal to include feminine hygiene products in the SNAP and WIC
programs, is appealing because it involves no out-of-pocket, upfront costs
for covered females.
One major issue with the ACA proposal is that the contraceptive
mandate has been rolled back by the Trump Administration. 236 The erosion
of the contraceptive mandate means that fewer women would be covered.237
Indeed, even without the newly issued directives from the Trump
Administration, 28.2 million Americans already do not have health insurance
coverage. 238 Uninsured women, therefore, would be excluded from the
229 E.g., Sara Sternberg Greene, The Broken Safety Net: A Study of Earned Income Tax Credit
Recipients and a Proposal for Repair, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 515, 538–43 (2013) (documenting the welfare
recipients’ perception of stigma and noting that 80% of those who qualify for the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) receive it, while only 50% of those who qualify for Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF), a welfare program, receive it); Susannah Camic Tahk, The Tax War on Poverty,
56 ARIZ. L. REV. 791, 828–29 (2014) (suggesting that, due to stigma associated with welfare, poor
individuals are more likely to file tax returns to obtain benefits than to utilize welfare programs).
230 See Tahk, supra note 229, at 828.
231 Greene, supra note 229, at 541.
232 Id. (“The universal sentiment of respondents was that they disliked being on welfare and wanted
to avoid it at all costs.”); see also id. at 523 (noting that welfare is so stigmatized that low-income families
would rather resort to credit cards when an unanticipated setback occurs).
233 Durkin, supra note 95, at 164.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Robert Pear, Rebecca R. Ruiz & Laurie Goodstein, Trump Administration Rolls Back Birth
Control Mandate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/us/politics/trumpcontraception-birth-control.html [https://perma.cc/UVT6-7PFK].
237 It is estimated that hundreds of thousands of women could lose benefits. Id.
238 Health Insurance Coverage, CDC (last updated Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
fastats/health-insurance.htm [https://perma.cc/BW3R-U5X9].
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benefits of including feminine hygiene products within the ACA’s
contraceptive mandate.
D. A Women’s Menstrual Health Credit
A society that aims to be just and egalitarian should not stop at repeal
because that does not solve the financial disparity between women who must
pay for menstrual hygiene products and men who do not. Rather, this Note
proposes that repeal should be combined with a Women’s Menstrual Health
Credit that reaches women of all income levels.
Consider again Amy and Ben. 239 Even in a no-tax world, Amy has to
spend extra dollars on menstrual hygiene products by virtue of her sex. She
thus ends up with a lower amount of welfare than Ben, who might be
increasing his welfare through saving or going to the movies. In order to truly
make Amy and Ben equal, the government has to redistribute from Ben to
Amy. Here, a horizontal equity issue arises again. It might seem unfair to tax
Ben more than Amy, seeing as how they are at the same level of income. But
if the market distribution is not presumptively just, then using pre-tax
outcomes as the baseline from which to set tax rates cannot be correct under
any egalitarian theory of redistributive justice. 240 Thus, it does not necessarily
follow that Amy and Ben must be taxed at the same rates. Indeed,
redistribution from Ben to Amy might be the correct outcome if our aim is
to equalize their relative levels of welfare.
Redistribution might be implemented through direct programs, such as
an expanded free-tampons-for-all program, or the tax system, through which
a refundable tax credit could be provided to all women of menstruating age.
In this case, the tax system is a better avenue. Because it is refundable, even
women with no tax liability to absorb the credit would benefit. This Section
proposes a women’s menstrual health credit that would be sufficient to cover
necessary costs associated with menstrual hygiene and health while also
serving the goals of equal treatment, encouraging women’s market work, and
assistance to caregivers—who are typically women. 241
Unlike a free-tampons-for-all scheme, which is too complex to
administer and limits a woman’s choice, 242 the tax credit involves lower
administrative costs and provides personal autonomy. Tacking the credit
239

See supra notes 157–60, 173–74 and accompanying text.
MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 43, at 31–37.
241 This proposal is essentially similar to Rep. Meng’s proposal for a $120 tax credit, except it is
expanded to cover all women on the basis that all women—not just low-income women—bear the costs
of menstruation. See supra text accompanying notes 88–94 for background information on the proposed
credit.
242 See supra Section III.B.
240
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onto the existing federal or state income tax system still imposes
administrative costs—but likely to a smaller degree. The difference is
between an additional line on the tax return and devoting time and resources
to buying and distributing tampons. Moreover, a tax credit provides women
with more choice over an intimate, intensely personal aspect of their lives.
Women have more freedom to choose how to spend that money, such as
using it to cover the entire cost of a year’s supply by purchasing low-cost
options or splitting it between tampons and medication for menstrual cramps.
In contrast, a direct program might limit the choices that women have, such
as between brands of tampons, or amounts and types of menstrual hygiene
products.
While SNAP/WIC is stigmatizing, 243 the provision of government
benefits through the tax system is less so. Instead of facing a two-tiered
welfare system that separates recipients into “deserving” and
“undeserving,” 244 women who receive a menstrual health credit through the
tax system participate in a one-tiered tax system that treats them as equals to
other taxpayers. 245 Everyone has to file tax returns at some point, but not
everyone applies for welfare benefits, which involves a separate process and
means testing. 246 In the context of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), a
refundable credit that is now the largest federal anti-poverty program, 247
commentators and recipients alike have praised the relative lack of stigma
associated with administering benefits through the tax system. 248 Indeed, the
take-up rate is higher among those eligible for the EITC than among those
eligible for welfare benefits, potentially because the EITC carries less
stigma. 249 A menstrual health credit promotes the feminist goal of equal
treatment 250 because women would not be forced into a separate system
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See supra notes 229–32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the stigma attached to SNAP
and WIC.
244 Susannah Camic Tahk, The New Welfare Rights, BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at
13–15) (on file with Northwestern University Law Review) (providing an overview of the two-tiered
welfare state).
245 See id. at 29 (arguing that the tax system “presents a one-tiered vision of equal citizenship”).
246 Tahk, supra note 229, at 828.
247 Id. at 794; see also Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Who’s Afraid of Redistribution? An Analysis of the
Earned Income Tax Credit, 74 MO. L. REV. 251, 283 (2009).
248 Id. at 262 (“[A] credit system run through the IRS and the income tax system avoids many of the
stigmas associated with traditional welfare.”); Greene, supra note 229, at 535, 539 (noting that no
respondent in a survey of EITC recipients reported feeling stigmatized); Tahk, supra note 229, at 828
(contrasting tax programs with nontax programs).
249 Tahk, supra note 229, at 829; see also David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of
Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 1010 (2004) (noting food stamps have a low
participation rate but the EITC has a high participation rate).
250 See supra note 184.
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simply to receive their menstrual health benefits. It would also reach more
women, enabling more women to participate in schools and the labor
market. 251
A tax credit that is generous enough to cover the costs of other products
associated with genital health would better reflect the realities of being a
woman than a repeal plus free-tampons program or the welfare approach
would, unless the program is willing to provide items like Midol. Such a
broad tax credit would recognize the fact that women need items beyond
tampons to live productive lives; for example, a woman who suffers from
debilitating menstrual cramps might need medication just to be able to go to
school or work. In some states, these medications may be exempt from the
sales tax as a medical expense, but the fact remains that women still need to
pay for such products, which are not covered by insurance because they are
not prescription medications.
A tax credit also avoids the issue of classifying the exemption. A debate
about whether vaginal creams or pregnancy tests should also be exempted if
menstrual hygiene products are exempted—a concern raised by one
commentator 252—could be avoided entirely on the basis that women can now
afford these products, sales tax or no sales tax. As previously mentioned,
reinterpreting exemptions for medical supplies to include menstrual hygiene
products might signal that periods are a disease or medical condition. 253
Indeed, a tax credit not only avoids this issue but also sends a message that
the unique financial burdens of menstruation and, more generally, women’s
health are recognized by the government; such a message might have a
positive effect on raising tax morale among women. 254
More significantly, while an exemption or a direct program would
provide more certainty of relief and require less action by low-income
women, a tax credit better addresses the issue of regressivity. 255 This
conclusion is independent of repeal, although this Note has concluded above
that repeal is desirable. Consider a new set of hypothetical taxpayers, Betty
and Bell. Betty, a highly educated and wealthy executive, buys $500 worth
of premium menstrual health products each year, paying $50 in sales taxes
assuming a 10% tax rate. Betty makes $100,000 a year, so this translates to
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See supra text accompanying notes 185–87.
See Allen, supra note 27.
253 See supra text accompanying notes 110–11.
254 See supra text accompanying notes 177–81.
255 Frederick W. Derrick & Charles E. Scott, Sales Tax Exemptions and Credits: Time to Reevaluate,
23 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 267, 268 (1995). However, the authors note that “credits are no more effective
than exemptions in affecting regressivity if the credit reaches fewer than 70 percent of the low-income
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0.55% of her income. Meanwhile, Bell, a working class woman, buys only
the bare necessities—about $100 worth of menstrual products each year,
paying $10 in taxes. She makes $20,000 a year, so she also spends 0.55% of
her income on her menstrual health. If we keep the tampon tax but provide a
tax credit of $100 to both Betty and Bell, Betty would have spent $450 on
her menstrual health, while Bell would have spent $10. This translates to
0.45% of Betty’s income versus 0.05% of Bell’s income. The difference
would be starker were there no tampon tax: before, both women would be
spending 0.5% of their respective incomes; after, Betty would be spending
0.4% while Bell would be spending 0%. The difference cannot be attributed
to gender discrimination, as it is Betty’s choice to buy premium, fancy
menstrual products that causes the difference. That is a consumption choice,
not a necessity. A menstrual health credit takes both choice and necessity
into account: it would remedy the financial disparity between men and
women by fully paying for the bare necessities, while preserving women’s
decision-making autonomy to choose high-end products.
Unlike a women’s menstrual health credit, a deduction would not
address the issue of regressivity. Indeed, a deduction for menstrual hygiene
products would itself be regressive. Consider again Betty and Bell. Because
our current rate structure is progressive, Betty would face a higher marginal
rate of taxation than Bell. 256 If they take the same deduction, Betty gets a
larger tax break than Bell because her marginal tax rate is higher. Even
worse, Bell will likely take the standard deduction, as it is unlikely that she
will have enough deductions to itemize. This would mean that Bell would
not get the benefit of a menstrual hygiene deduction at all.
One major concern with providing government benefits through the tax
system is timing. 257 In comparison to a system where women could access
free tampons or buy them with insurance or SNAP/WIC benefits throughout
the year, a menstrual health credit lacks that advantage because women
would have to absorb the costs of feminine hygiene products up front and
recoup their spending with a tax credit they receive at the end of the taxable
year. Despite this disadvantage, a tax credit is the best way to reach the most
women because many people must file tax returns. 258 Even for those who
256 For the 2017 tax year, Betty would face a marginal tax rate of 28%, while Bell would face a
marginal tax rate of 15%, assuming both are single. See Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707 (2017
tax brackets). Assume that each spends $100 in menstrual hygiene products in 2017, and each claims that
amount as a deduction. The value of the deduction is higher to Betty, because she would save $28 (0.28
* $100), while Bell would only save $15 (0.15 * $100).
257 See Greene, supra note 229, at 560–61 (observing that unless unanticipated financial setbacks
occur in conjunction with tax refund season, low-income families often turn to credit cards).
258 Generally, taxpayers have to file a tax return if their gross income exceeds the sum of the standard
deduction and the personal exemption. See IRS, I.R.S. PUB. NO. 501, CAT. NO. 15000U; EXEMPTIONS,

150

113:109 (2018)

Bleeding Women Dry

ordinarily might prefer to avoid the hassle of filing a tax return if they do not
need to do so, the availability of the menstrual health credit plus other tax
credits and deductions should incentivize them to file. 259
Having concluded above that menstruation is a source of inequity that
directly stems from biological sex, 260 it would not be fair to extend a tax
credit only to low-income women and leave other women in the lurch.
Concededly, this argument is a slippery slope, in that granting a women’s
health credit would open the door to other credits premised on reducing
gender inequalities. But that is not in itself a devastating critique. To achieve
large-scale change, small steps must be taken and small victories
accomplished that set in motion successive initiatives. There are other
inequalities associated with being a woman, such as being paid less than
men. 261 The tax system should be used to remedy these inequalities. After all,
the tax system is “not just a method of payment for government and public
services: [it is] also the most important instrument by which the political
system puts into practice a conception of economic or distributive justice.”262
But, regardless of the foregoing, a line can be convincingly drawn. The
inequity caused by menstruation is easily measured in dollars and cents, and
the cause of that inequity is clearly solely driven by sex differences, i.e.,
women menstruate and men do not. In contrast, differences in salaries cannot
be attributed solely to sex, and rather depend on a variety of factors such as
STANDARD DEDUCTION, AND FILING INFORMATION (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p501.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BKJ7-4HT2]. One must file a tax return to receive a refund, including tax credits. Id.
Apart from the fact that most people have to file a tax return, the costs associated with filing a tax return
are also lower than the cost of buying insurance. A taxpayer can always fill out paper forms and mail
them for free, and a variety of free tax preparation software is available for those with more complicated
tax situations. Brian Acton, The Ultimate Guide to Filing Your Taxes for Free, ABC NEWS (Jan. 26, 2017,
5:14
AM),
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/ultimate-guide-filing-taxes-free/story?id=45014235
[https://perma.cc/4YT8-LP53] (cataloging approximately twenty ways to file taxes at no cost).
259 See Marsha Blumenthal, Brian Erard & Chih-Chin Ho, Participation and Compliance with the
Earned Income Tax Credit, 58 NAT’L. TAX. J. 189, 201 (2005) (finding a higher likelihood of filing if
eligible for EITC). Increasing the size of benefits available through the tax system could increase filing
rates and take-up rates of tax credits. See id. at 210 (finding a positive association between the size of
EITC and both filing a return and claiming the credit). Furthermore, wage earners should be able to claim
the menstrual health credit on behalf of their dependents, so as to avoid the need for stay-at-home mothers
and teenage daughters to file their own returns.
260 See supra notes 167–174 and accompanying text.
261 See Women’s Bureau, Breaking Down the Gender Wage Gap, U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/wb/media/gender_wage_gap.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TP9-V8F9]. While these
statistics are controversial, the point is not necessarily that there is a wage gap due entirely to gender, but
that if there is one, the tax system is a good way to bridge that gap.
262 MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 43, at 3. Of course, each demogrant must be judged on its own
merits so as to avoid impermissible discrimination and guard against malicious motivations. In the context
of a women’s menstrual health credit, there may be age discrimination issues because age brackets are
likely a rational way to determine menstruation, which is a driving force for the credit. This statutory and
constitutional question is beyond the scope of this Note and must be explored separately.
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education levels and work experience. The pay gap stemming from gender
alone, then, is difficult, if not almost impossible, to quantify. A motivated
government might ignore the administrative inconvenience of such a
calculation and forge ahead, but the task is daunting. A women’s health tax
credit, on the other hand, is a much more realistic possibility.
Related to the slippery slope critique is the idea that if we grant a tax
credit for menstrual hygiene products, we should also grant one for malespecific items. The foremost response to this line of reasoning is that there
are few, if any, male-specific items. The closest analogue might be Viagra,
but even then, erectile dysfunction is a diagnosable medical disorder rather
than a condition of being male. Some women, too, may have female-specific
medical disorders such as uterine cancer. Thus, Viagra is usually covered
under prescription medication exemptions. 263 A tax credit for Viagra or
uterine cancer medications might be justified on the theory that medical bad
luck is a source of inequality between taxpayers—beyond the scope of this
Note—but not on the theory of sex inequality.
Finally, an objection might be made that the women’s menstrual health
credit is overinclusive and underinclusive. 264 Specifically, because eligibility
for the tax credit is based on age, it would include nonmenstruating women
such as pregnant mothers and women on extended-cycle birth control pills.
It would also exclude women outside the age brackets who are menstruating.
Yet many taxes and tax credits are guilty of the same thing. For example, the
EITC is intended to help low-income working parents but does not provide
an increase in the amount of the credit beyond three children. 265 The EITC
also provides a small credit for childless workers. 266 When creating tax
regimes, policymakers must draw lines somewhere, and any line drawing
almost always creates some undesired exclusions and inclusions.
A women’s menstrual health credit best advances each of the goals that
Alstott articulated.267 It ensures that women do not lose out financially
compared to men by virtue of their periods. It encourages women’s market
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See supra note 161.
The same criticism could be made of the proposal to provide free tampons in schools, prisons and
homeless shelters, see supra Section III.B, or the proposal to expand SNAP/WIC benefits to include
tampons, see supra Section III.C. The difference, however, is the degree of underinclusiveness. The tax
credit would cover more women—low-income or otherwise—than a SNAP/WIC expansion or freetampons program would cover.
265 Briefing Book: What Is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)?, TAX POL’Y CTR.,
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-earned-income-tax-credit-eitc
[https://perma.cc/E3GX-ZMVS].
266 David R. Francis, The Earned Income Tax Credit Raises Employment, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON.
RES., http://www.nber.org/digest/aug06/w11729.html [https://perma.cc/K42A-JGD2].
267 See supra notes 183–90 and accompanying text.
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work by ensuring women can participate at work and school while on their
periods. Finally, it improves women’s economic security by compensating
them for the financial burdens of menstruation.
To be clear, the foregoing does not mean that the tampon tax should not
be repealed. Although a tax credit would not create a messy tax base like a
repeal would, and would entirely remove the financial burden of
menstruation, it still creates a timing issue, as discussed earlier. And from a
political standpoint, an exemption for menstrual hygiene products is still
desirable, despite its inefficiencies, both because it would benefit women
who lack the time, motivation, or sophistication to file a tax return and
because the tax is a form of gender discrimination that sends a message that
women’s periods are choices that should be taxed. Given the financial
burdens of menstruation entirely apart from the tax itself, activists should
demand more than repeal. A women’s health credit that mitigates the impact
of those burdens supplements repeal by serving an equal treatment goal and
ensuring women’s economic security and participation in the public sphere.
CONCLUSION
In the past few years, a movement to repeal the tampon tax has been
gaining ground: Canada repealed its tax on menstrual hygiene products in
2015, and in the United States, Illinois, New York, and Connecticut followed
suit. Proposals for repeal are being considered today. This Note, however,
has shown that repeal is only half of the fight. In order to achieve a more
equal footing between men and women, more needs to be done. The financial
burdens of menstruation are one source of that inequality, and the tax code
is an excellent tool to remedy it. As Professor Edward McCaffery once
insightfully commented on the tax code:
[S]ociety has done things—many things, for many years—slanted against
women. Calling it quits now is not fair, and it is certainly not “neutral,”
whatever that would mean. It would seem only to mean that we would bury the
sins of the past, by fiat, and leave them in place, unchallenged and
unacknowledged, forever. It turns out that tax is not only the locus of many of
our greatest sins, it is also an excellent place to look for change. 268

That change is repealing the tampon tax and granting a women’s health
credit.
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MCCAFFERY, supra note 133, at 274.

153

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

154

